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Targeting, Command Judgment, and a 
Proposed Quantum of Information 
Component 
A FOURTH AMENDMENT LESSON IN CONTEXTUAL 
REASONABLENESS 
Geoffrey S. Corn† 
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable basis in 
necessity? . . . And thus it will always be when courts try to look into the 
reasonableness of a military order. In the very nature of things, military 
decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not 
pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that often 
would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved.1 
INTRODUCTION 
No decision by a military commander engaged in 
hostilities has more profound consequences than the decision to 
launch an attack. The decision to attack almost always sets in 
motion the use of deadly combat power and routinely produces 
loss of life or grievous bodily injury, often to individuals and 
property not the intended object of attack (i.e., “collateral 
damage”). This targeting process2 is made in a myriad of 
contexts, sometimes involving split-second decisions by soldiers 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in Houston, 
Texas. Previously Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, and Special Assistant to the U.S. 
Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters. I would like to thank Jessica 
Poarch for her excellent contributions in support of completing this Article. 
 1 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 2 For an overview of the military targeting process and its relationship to the 
law of armed conflict, see Geoffrey S. Corn & Lieutenant Colonel Gary P.M. Corn, The 
Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, TEX. 
INT’L L.J. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913962. 
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at the proverbial “tip of the spear,”3 sometimes involving 
complex and deliberate processes at high levels of command, 
and sometimes involving summarized processes at those same 
levels of command to address time-sensitive targeting 
requirements. In all these contexts, the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) provides the test for ensuring target legality. Pursuant 
to the LOAC, the decision to attack must be based on the 
judgment that the object of attack—a person, place, or thing—
qualifies as a lawful military objective. This test is intended to 
ensure that the harmful consequences of military hostilities are 
confined as much as possible to the lawful objects of violence. 
In so doing, the test provides the primary (although not 
exclusive) barrier against unjustifiably injuring other persons, 
places, and things that are protected from being deliberately 
attacked.4 Deliberately attacking individuals or objects that do 
not qualify as lawful military targets violates the LOAC. 
Accordingly, the meaning of this rule has also been central to 
war-crimes prosecutions related to unlawful targeting and has 
been a significant aspect in the development of the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court.5  
This LOAC equation is universally accepted as the 
controlling standard for assessing target legality. Despite the 
customary law status of this equation, there is far from perfect 
clarity as to what is or is not a lawful military objective, and 
the test’s application to the range of potential targets in 
contemporary armed conflicts is extremely complex. It is 
therefore unsurprising that this test, along with the LOAC 
  
 3 One U.S. Marine Corps commander characterized this process as a three-
second decision cycle—the front line combatant has one second to observe, one second to 
assess, and one second to decide. See Civilians Safer, Are Marines Worse Off?, 
LEATHERNECK: MARINE CORPS COMMUNITY FOR MARINE VETERANS (Oct. 10, 2009, 9:47 
AM), http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=90021 (“Battalion Commander 
Lt. Col. Christian Cabaniss describes the new mission of restraint. ‘Killing a thousand 
Taliban is great but if I kill two civilians in the process, it’s a loss . . . . I told the Marines 
before we deployed it’s about a three-second decision, especially with his personal 
weapon. The first second is “Can I.” The next two are: “Should I? What is going to be 
the effect of my action? Will it move the Afghan closer to the government or further 
away?” . . . . Decisive is winning the consent of the people. Winning is really the 
government of Afghanistan filling the vacuum with delivery of governance.’”).  
 4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
51, 57, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc125641e0052b079 
[hereinafter Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions]. 
 5 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 190 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 694-706 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).  
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principles it is derived from, has been a significant subject of 
judicial decisions, scholarship, and analysis by legal 
departments of many armed forces.6 The rule establishes its 
own analytical methodology for assessing the legality of 
potential targets—a methodology that produces inherent 
uncertainties. Nevertheless, despite its complexity, in practical 
terms the LOAC target legality framework is based on two 
simple countervailing presumptions: targeting the enemy is 
allowed, but targeting civilians is not. 
The LOAC presumes that members of the enemy armed 
forces (including members of armed organized opposition 
groups in the context of noninternational armed conflicts), 
their equipment, military facilities, and installations are lawful 
objects of attack7 until rendered hors de combat.8 Rebutting this 
presumption requires surrender or some other event that 
renders the person, place, or thing effectively out of combat 
(such as wounds, sickness, or incapacitation of the equipment).9 
In contrast, all other persons, places, or things are considered 
civilian and are accordingly presumed protected from being 
deliberately attacked.10 This presumption, however, is also 
rebuttable. For persons, the presumption is rebutted by their 
  
 6 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 47, 51 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT 
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 89-92 (2d ed. 
2010); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN WAR 520-27 (2010); Maj. Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, & Beyond: 
Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155 
(2000); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 54-
57 (2004). Most of these analytical efforts have focused on defining the constituent 
elements of the military objective test: clarifying the substantive meaning to terms like 
“definite military advantage,” “effective contribution,” “prevailing conditions at the 
time,” and the cumulative effect of all of these qualifiers for making the military 
objective determination. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 
¶¶ 51, 316 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).  
 7 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 89 (interpreting Article 48 of Additional Protocol I).  
 8 Article 41.2 of Protocol I provides: 
A person is hors de combat if: 
(a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; 
(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or 
(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds 
or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself; 
provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does 
not attempt to escape. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4.  
 9 Id. art. 41. 
 10 Id. art. 51.  
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direct participation in hostilities.11 For places and things, the 
presumption is rebutted when those places and things “which 
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”12 
Complexity arises, however, when belligerents consider 
attacking persons, places, and things that do not fall into these 
clearly defined categories. In the contemporary battlespace 
there is an almost endless potential variety of persons, places, 
and things not readily definable as “military” or “civilian,” 
which are sometimes referred to as “dual-use targets.”13 While 
attacking such dual-use targets is not presumptively legal, 
Article 52 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (AP I) does provide an equation for 
determining when such an attack is allowed.14 Pursuant to that 
rule, virtually anything can qualify as a lawful object of attack 
when its “nature, location, purpose or use” contributes to the 
enemy’s war effort, and its “total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization” (under the circumstances) “offers a definite 
military advantage.”15  
These countervailing presumptions and the complexity 
arising out of their confluence reflect a balance between the 
two foundational principles of the LOAC: military necessity 
and humanity. Military necessity justifies inflicting death and 
destruction on the enemy;16 humanity prohibits inflicting any 
suffering that is not necessary to bring about the prompt 
submission of enemy forces.17 This delicate balance has in turn 
  
 11 Id. art. 51.3 (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”).  
 12 Id. art. 52.2.  
 13 Definition of “Battlespace Awareness,” DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY 
TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary (search “battlespace awareness”) 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2011). 
 14 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4. 
 15 Id. art. 52.2 (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so 
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”). 
 16 General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field ¶ 15 (Apr. 24, 1863), available at http://www.civilwarhome.com/ 
liebercode.htm. 
 17 Geoffrey Corn, Principle of Humanity, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. 
INT’L L. (Feb. 2010), http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/ 
entries/law-9780199231690-e1810&recno=1&author=Corn%20%20Geoffrey%20S; SOLIS, 
supra note 6, at 258. 
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manifested the principle of distinction18—a universally 
applicable19 principle characterized by the International Court 
of Justice as “cardinal” and designated as the “Basic Rule” in 
AP I.20 The principle of distinction requires belligerents to 
constantly distinguish between lawful objects of attack and all 
other persons, places, and things.21 While the principle of 
distinction is a manifestation of the balance between military 
necessity and humanity, it is also an expression of perhaps an 
even more central tenet of the LOAC: the assumption that the 
only legitimate object of war is to weaken enemy forces.22 
Accordingly, the legal regulation of targeting is based on a 
conclusive presumption that the deliberate infliction of death 
or destruction to civilians or civilian property will never 
contribute to this objective, thereby obligating belligerents to 
limit their destructive efforts to military objectives only.23 The 
framework for determining what is and is not a lawful target of 
attack is known as the military objective test. 
This article proposes a quantum of information 
framework to facilitate the effective implementation of the 
military objective test. In support of this proposal, the article 
will provide a comparative analysis of United States 
constitutional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, focused 
specifically on the relationship between several distinct 
quantum of proof standards for assessing reasonableness and 
the interests they were developed to balance. The basis for this 
proposed analogy is that reasonableness is the common 
touchstone for both the combat targeting process and the 
constitutionality of police intrusion. The Fourth Amendment 
quantum framework is deliberately responsive to the myriad of 
  
 18 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 62. 
 19 Id. at 8 (stating that “no circumstance would justify any deviation from the 
principle” of distinction).  
 20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/icj/text/iunan_ 
ijudgment_19960708_Advisory_Opinion.htm; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, supra note 4, art. 48.  
 21 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 48.  
 22 This tenet of the law was articulated in one of the first multi-lateral treaties 
developed to regulate hostilities, the St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use in 
Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 
Consol. T.S. 297, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument 
(“Considering: . . . That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . .”). 
 23 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 78-79 (July 8), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/icj/text/ 
iunan_ijudgment_19960708_Advisory_Opinion.htm (describing the principle of 
distinction as an “intransgressible principle[] of international customary law”).  
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operational variables police confront when making time-
sensitive decisions, and accordingly has been made central to 
determining compliance with the Constitution’s reasonableness 
requirement. The scope of lawful authority exercised by police 
is clearly different from that exercised by military commanders 
in the context of armed conflict. However, as will be explained, 
the Supreme Court’s specific emphasis on developing a 
contextual reasonableness framework to respond to the 
challenges confronted by police in the execution of their duties 
parallels the analogous contextual variables confronted by 
commanders in battle. Because of this parallel, the LOAC 
should adopt the shifting quantum of information framework 
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and apply it to 
determining the requisite amount of information a commander 
must have to legitimately hold the reasonable belief that a 
person, place, or thing qualifies as a lawful military objective. 
The value derived from analogy to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is that it provides an illustration of how and why 
the quantum associated with reasonableness must be situation-
dependent. This contextual reasonableness equation is based 
on the premise that a logical symmetry should exist between 
the nature of the intrusion on a protected interest and the 
quantum of information necessary to render the intrusion 
reasonable: the greater the degree of intrusion, the more 
information is required to render the action reasonable.24 
Implicit within this premise is the accordant assumption that 
as the nature of the intrusion becomes more significant, the 
law becomes less tolerant of error. Thus, while it is an axiom of 
search and seizure law that “reasonable does not always mean 
right,” it becomes more difficult to conclude that an error in 
  
 24 Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the 
Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))). With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless 
search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered “no.” See 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is 
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this 
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his 
own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to 
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to 
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be 
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.”).  
2012] TARGETING 443 
judgment is reasonable as the degree of intrusion increases.25 
Accordingly, the requisite quantum of information is lower for 
minimal intrusions but escalates proportionally with the 
degree of intrusion and the accordant consequence of erroneous 
government decisions.  
A note of caution is in order. Nothing in this article is 
intended to suggest that domestic criminal law principles 
should define the law of battlefield targeting. Indeed, 
challenging the intrusion of human rights–based law 
enforcement principles into the realm of target decision making 
confuses operational clarity. This blurring of the line between 
human rights principles and the law of armed conflict targeting 
produces a dangerous erosion of targeting authority, the thesis 
of an article recently published by the author.26 Nor is this 
article intended to suggest that the analogy to Fourth 
Amendment principles is a perfect solution for addressing the 
quantum of information lacunae in the law of military 
targeting, or that the application of these principles will 
eliminate all subjectivity in the target decision-making process. 
No legal test can achieve that goal; and no matter what 
framework is employed to assess target legality, its efficacy will 
almost invariably depend on the subjective good faith of the 
decision maker. Instead, this article simply asserts that the 
many analogies between Fourth Amendment principles of 
reasonableness and the reasonableness component of the 
target-legality assessment warrant careful consideration of the 
methodologies employed in the domestic sphere to add clarity 
to the decision maker’s judgment. 
In spite of the differences between the law of peace and 
the law of war, the need for a workable definition of 
reasonableness is as, if not more, important to military 
commanders as to police officers. The Fourth Amendment 
contextual reasonableness equation this article posits provides 
a potential foundation for the development of a framework to 
facilitate compliance with the reasonableness component of the 
target decision-making process. Both an assessment of 
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context, as well as a 
  
 25 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86 (“It is apparent that in order to satisfy the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of 
the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”).  
 26 See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The 
Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52 (2010). 
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similar information/reasonableness equation, will not only 
balance the needs of the military commander with individual 
rights, but will also accommodate the legitimate interests of 
“tip of the spear” operatives and of those responsible for 
assessing their decisions.  
Following this introduction, Part I of this article 
addresses the relationship between the LOAC and the military 
targeting process. Part II discusses the concept of 
reasonableness as it relates to that process and to U.S. criminal 
search and seizure law. Part III outlines the contextual 
reasonableness equation, which is based on the proportional 
relationship between the nature of the intrusion on a protected 
interest and the quantum of information required to render 
that intrusion reasonable. Parts IV and V propose a framework 
for application to the military targeting process, and then the 
article concludes. 
I. TARGET DECISION MAKING 
In the simplest terms, targets are those persons, places, 
or things deliberately subjected to attack by a military force.27 
Targeting refers to the process of identifying lawful objects of 
attack, determining the desired effect to be achieved by attack, 
selecting the means and method of producing this effect, 
striking the target, and assessing the effect.28 The target 
selection and engagement process begins with the military 
mission. Operational planners determine how best to leverage 
the capabilities of the military unit to achieve the effects 
deemed necessary to accomplish the mission (effects which 
generally include destruction, neutralization, denial, 
harassment, and disruption).29 From a military operational 
perspective, the targeting process is central to achieving 
tactical and operational success because it maximizes the 
effectiveness of friendly capabilities in bringing about 
submission of an enemy.30 According to U.S. joint-targeting 
doctrine, “The purpose of the joint targeting process is to 
provide the commander with a methodology linking objectives 
with effects throughout the battlespace. The targeting process 
  
 27 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60: JOINT DOCTRINE FOR 
TARGETING I-4 (Jan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-
doctrine/jp3_60(02).pdf. 
 28 Id. at I-3.  
 29 Id. at II.  
 30 Id. at I-3.  
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provides a logical progression as an aid to decision making and 
ensures consistency with the commander’s objectives.”31 This 
decision-making process is not limited to a mature planning 
context since every soldier who aims and fires a rifle on the 
battlefield is in fact engaging in the process (although, by 
virtue of the situation, the extent of such analysis will normally 
be substantially abbreviated). 
Because not everything in the battlespace may be 
subject to attack, one of the most important aspects of the 
targeting process is determining who and what qualifies as a 
lawful object of attack. Indeed, the obligation to distinguish 
between lawful objects of attack (lawful targets) and all other 
persons, places, and things protected from being deliberately 
attacked is perhaps the most important principle of the 
LOAC—the principle of distinction.32 The legal standard for 
making this determination during armed conflict is central to 
conflict regulation and is universally regarded as a customary 
element of the law applicable to both international (interstate) 
and noninternational armed conflicts.33  
Along with the principle of distinction, another 
foundational element of the LOAC conflict regulation 
framework is the principle of military necessity. The principle 
of military necessity justifies the deliberate infliction of 
destructive combat power only when doing so is necessary to 
bring about the prompt submission of an enemy. This principle 
by implication prohibits the application of combat power that is 
not expected to contribute to this effect, for absent such an 
expectation the use could never be considered necessary.34 This 
principle is directly related to the protection of the civilian 
population from the sufferings associated with armed conflict 
and is central to the derivative principle of distinction. The 
principle of distinction is implemented by compliance with the 
LOAC rules of military objective35 and proportionality.36 The 
  
 31 Id. at I-2(a).  
 32 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 48; 
DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 89 (interpreting Article 48 of Additional Protocol I). 
 33 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 100-27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http://icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm; 
DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 129; Smidt, supra note 6, at 156-59; see also UK MINISTRY 
OF DEFENCE, supra note 6.  
 34 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE 3 (1956). 
 35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2 
(“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are 
 
446 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
rule of military objective ensures that commanders select only 
lawful targets for deliberate attack;37 the rule of proportionality 
ensures that these targets are not engaged in an indiscriminate 
manner.38 These rules were developed to ensure that the 
deliberate objects of attack are limited to only lawful military 
objects, and that anticipated and unavoidable incidental 
consequences of attacking lawful objectives are not so excessive 
as to nullify the legitimacy of the deliberate attack.  
These rules do not imply, however, that the knowing 
infliction of harm on civilians or civilian property necessarily 
renders an attack unlawful. Instead, the rule of military objective 
provides the prima facie standard for determining the legality of 
attacking a target. The knowing, but unavoidable, harm to 
civilians or civilian property is considered as part of a second level 
of analysis to determine whether an attack is indiscriminate.39 
When such harm is anticipated to be excessive in relation to the 
military advantage produced by targeting the deliberate object of 
attack, the attack is treated as indiscriminate and therefore 
unlawful. This assessment process occurs, either formally or 
informally, within the targeting process.40 
 The rule of military objective, articulated in Article 52 
of AP I,41 is considered the single most important treaty 
expression of the legal framework for target decision making 
(although it has not been adopted by a number of states, 
including the United States and Israel42). In order to facilitate 
compliance with this basic principle of distinction, AP I 
established an express definition of lawful military objectives, 
  
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstance ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”).  
 36 Id. art. 51.5(b) (defining indiscriminate attacks); id. art. 57.2(b) (“[A]n 
attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent . . . that the attack may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of human life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.”).  
 37 Id. art. 52.2. 
 38 Id. (defining military objectives). See DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 128-30 
(discussing proportionality). 
 39  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 40 MAJ. R. CRAIG BURTON, 86TH LAW OF WAR COURSE: MEANS & METHOD OF 
WARFARE D-3 (International Operational Law TJAGLCS Law of War Course, 2006).  
 41 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52. 
 42 See International Humanitarian Law—State Parties/Signatories to 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2011).  
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codified in Article 51 of the treaty.43 The first Article 51 
definition provides that the “civilian population as such, as well 
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”44 AP I, 
however, excludes captives entitled to prisoner of war status 
from the definition of civilian45 (with the exception of civilians 
who accompany the armed forces in the field to provide 
support46). Accordingly, these “combatants” are by implication 
lawful objects of attack.47 Places and things, however, must be 
analyzed pursuant to a different equation. In recognition of the 
inevitable variables of the operational environment, AP I does 
not provide an exhaustive list of military objectives. Instead, it 
provides a test for assessing whether each proposed target 
qualifies for attack or whether it must be treated as a civilian 
place or object protected from attack. This test is codified in 
Article 52, which provides: “[M]ilitary objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.”48 Accordingly, determining target legality requires 
a case-by-case assessment based on a combination of factors 
related to the military situation (defined by U.S. military 
doctrine as METT-T-C: the mission, enemy, troops available, 
terrain, time, and presence of civilians).49 A central component 
  
 43 Passed in 1977, API is a supplementary treaty to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions which broadens the scope of protection for victims of international armed 
conflicts. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE, 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST, 1949, at 31 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. More specifically, Article 
51 is given the distinction as “one of the most important articles in the Protocol” by the 
drafters of the Commentary to API. Id. at 615. This article codifies the rule of 
customary international law that requires armed forces to refrain, as much as possible, 
from endangering or harming innocent civilians in the midst of an armed conflict. Id. 
Article 51 also provides standards by which to apply this rule. Id.  
 44 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 51.2.  
 45 Id. art. 50.1 (excluding from the definition of civilians “persons referred to 
in Article 4 (A)(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention”); Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4A(1)-(3), (6), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining “prisoners of war”); COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 611. 
 46 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra 
note 45, art. 4A(4). 
 47 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 146; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, supra note 4, art. 50; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, 
supra note 43, at 610-12.  
 48 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2.  
 49 UNITED STATES DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS 
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 145-46 (2007).  
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of this analysis is the complimentary rule established by 
Article 51 of AP I: “The presence or movements of the civilian 
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military operations, in 
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks 
or to shield, favour or impede military operations.”50  
In accordance with this rule, a determination that 
civilians are located in the vicinity of a place or thing that 
otherwise qualifies as a lawful military objective does not 
render the objective immune from attack. Instead, the 
attacking commander is obligated to analyze the legality of the 
attack pursuant to the complimentary prohibition against 
indiscriminate attacks and assess whether the anticipated 
harm to civilians or civilian property will be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. This comparison is commonly referred to as the 
proportionality analysis.51  
The predicate lawful military objective assessment, 
however, remains the cornerstone of lawful targeting. Three of 
the most significant components of the military objective test 
are derived from the prong of Article 52 requiring that the 
target’s “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, 
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”52  
First, the law clearly recognizes that the desired effect of 
an attack need not be total destruction.53 This is consistent with 
military doctrine, and specifically principles of military 
operations.54 Commanders employ combat power to achieve 
desired effects; effects that often do not require total destruction 
or capture of an enemy capability.55 For example, in addition to 
target destruction, the doctrinal mission of indirect fire assets 
(such as artillery) also includes disruption, harassment, and 
degradation. Another example is the use of a minefield to deny 
access or egress to an enemy. If the use of the mines never results 
in the destruction of an enemy asset, the effect may nonetheless 
be achieved by depriving the enemy of a certain area. 
  
 50 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 51.7.  
 51 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 130-33. The proportionality analysis is 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C, infra. 
 52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2.  
 53 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 631-32.  
 54  See Corn & Corn, supra note 2. 
 55 See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 27. 
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Second, operational judgments must be made (and 
ultimately critiqued) based on the situation prevailing at the 
time of the decision.56 The purpose of this qualification is to 
prevent the “slippery slope” that would result if commanders 
could justify attacks based purely on speculation that the place 
or thing might be used in the future in a manner that would 
render it a military objective. This does not, of course, mean 
that considering anticipated value is impermissible. Rather, a 
commander must have some basis in fact to support the 
conclusion that a potential future use of a place or thing 
renders it a military objective.  
Third, the advantage gained by targeting a place or 
thing must be “definite.”57 Again, the purpose of this qualifier is 
to prevent unfounded speculation or conjecture on the value 
gained by targeting a place or thing. However, no commander 
can know with absolute certainty the value to be gained from 
attacking a target until the attack is actually executed (and 
even then assessment of effects is often incomplete). What the 
“definite” qualifier is intended to prevent is general speculation 
on some attenuated value of target engagement.58 So long as 
the commander acts with a good-faith basis that the target 
engagement will produce a tangible operational or tactical 
advantage for his force, the qualifier is satisfied.59 
These three components of the military objective test 
reveal that a commander making a legality determination must 
inevitably rely on information available at the time of the 
decision, ideally in the form of intelligence, but often in the 
form of unrefined battlefield information.60 The quantity and 
  
 56 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 636; see 
also SOLIS, supra note 6, at 286-90 (citing The Hostage Case and concluding that “[a]s 
the opinion makes clear . . . the standard of guilt or innocence is the facts as they 
appeared to the accused at the time, given the circumstances at the time”).  
 57 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 636. 
 58 Id. at 684. 
 59 Id. at 682. 
 60 Battlefield information is not intelligence because it is information that 
has not been subjected to analysis. Intelligence is the product of such analysis:  
Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information 
concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or 
areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity 
that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity 
(JP 2-0). The Army generates intelligence through the intelligence 
warfighting function. 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, INTELLIGENCE (FM-2-0) 1-8 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf. 
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quality of this information is highly dependent on multiple 
variables, ranging from the time available to assess a potential 
target to the sophistication of the intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities supporting the decision.61 Even in the 
most time-sensitive decision-making situations, however, the law 
of military objective requires some factual information to support 
a reasonable judgment of target legality, thereby rejecting 
speculation based on nothing more than operational instinct. 
Simply put, attacking based solely on a hunch is never allowed. 
II. REASONABLENESS IN TARGETING 
It is axiomatic that a commander must exercise 
reasonable judgment when deciding the legality of a potential 
target. As such, it is also indubitable that any post hoc critique 
of a targeting decision will involve an assessment of 
reasonableness. In the context of a criminal prosecution for 
unlawful targeting, this assessment would be determinative of 
whether a commander engaged in a reckless attack (the 
culpability standard adopted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia62), and would be the first step 
in determining whether the commander engaged in a willful 
attack on a protected person or place (the culpability standard 
reflected in AP I and for the crime of attacking civilians according 
to the International Criminal Court63). The ubiquity of the 
“reasonableness” requirement is hardly surprising, considering 
that the law routinely requires government agents to exercise 
their judgment reasonably (particularly when that discretion 
implicates life or liberty). While the criminal culpability standard 
used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) may appear to make reasonableness more 
central to an assessment of guilt,64 the important point here is 
  
 61 Id. at 1-21.  
 62 Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Separate & Partially Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia, ¶ 103 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 
2003), http://icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-so031205e.pdf (“Despite my aforementioned 
disagreements with certain of the Majority’s factual findings, I share in the conclusion 
that the Prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that, in a number of 
instances, the SRK either deliberately or recklessly fired at civilians in Sarajevo during 
the Indictment Period.”). It should be noted that the use of a recklessness standard by 
the ICTY is of questionable validity. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 63 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e), July 17, 
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/ 
statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 64 Incidentally, this is why it also appears inconsistent with established 
standards of criminal responsibility for targeting decisions. 
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that assessing the reasonableness of a targeting judgment is the 
inherent first step in determining whether the commander’s 
decision was legal. 
A. The Reasonableness Requirement 
There are two ways this reasonableness component of 
compliance relates to the rule of military objective. First, 
criminal compliance relates to determining lawful objects of 
attack by deciding on the appropriate perspective for critiquing 
the reasonableness of battlefield judgments. Here, the critique 
of objective reasonableness must be made through the 
subjective perception of the decision maker at the time the 
decision was made, not retrospectively. Second, the compliance 
relates to the military objective test in assessing the probative 
value of information available to the commander65 at the time of 
the decision (resulting in a principle analogous to the doctrine 
of willful blindness: when a decision maker had information 
available but chose to ignore that information, the knowledge 
that would have been gained will effectively be imputed to the 
decision maker for purposes of assessing reasonableness).66 
International law does not clearly define the amount of 
information required for a targeting judgment to be considered 
reasonable. Nothing in Article 50 or its associated 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary 
indicates the quantum of information necessary to render 
“reasonable” a judgment of target legality. Instead, the 
Commentary merely emphasizes the importance of satisfying 
the elements of the military objective test.67 Because AP I 
focuses primarily on operational regulation (and only 
secondarily on criminal responsibility), this omission might be 
understandable. But the failure to address the requisite 
  
 65 I will use the term “commander” throughout this article to denote the 
operational decision maker responsible for authorizing an attack, and therefore 
responsible for making the judgment of target legality. However, the rule of military 
objective is also applicable to other operational decision makers who might not be in a 
formal position of command. For example, staff operations officers and front line 
soldiers routinely determine what qualifies as a lawful object of attack. Use of the term 
“commander” is not intended to suggest the rule is limited only to individuals with 
lawful command authority.  
 66 See MELVYN ZARR ET AL., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 2.14 (1997), available at http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/ 
menu/judges/jurycharges/PJI.pdf; Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 184 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006), http://icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/ 
gal-acjud061130.pdf.  
 67 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 635-36.  
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quantum is unjustifiable since the rule has slowly transformed 
into a basis for criminal responsibility both at the ad hoc 
international war crimes tribunals68 and in the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court.69 This may be attributable 
to the fact that the criminal liability standards related to 
unlawful attack require a higher standard of mental culpability 
than mere unreasonableness.  
Several war crimes for attacking civilians require proof 
that the perpetrator intended civilians to be the object of 
attack. For instance, as noted above, both AP I and the offenses 
established for the International Criminal Court prohibit the 
intentional attack on protected persons or property. For the 
war crime of attacking “civilian objects” established for the 
International Criminal Court, Article 8 requires that a 
perpetrator intentionally attacked civilians during what the 
perpetrator knew was an armed conflict.70  
Proof of intent requires more than a determination that 
the attack was unreasonable, since a perpetrator’s 
unreasonable decision to attack does not necessarily mean he 
intended to attack civilians. On the other hand, the decision to 
intentionally attack civilians is always unreasonable. 
Therefore, a more attenuated culpability standard—separate 
from the existing “intentional” standard—is necessary to 
provide a clear and genuine method for assessing post hoc 
whether the decision to attack meets the “unreasonableness” 
required for criminal culpability.  
  
 68 See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 51 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-
tj031205e.pdf (stating that “an object shall not be attacked when it is not reasonable to 
believe . . .” but failing to address the meaning of reasonableness).  
 69 Rome Statute, supra note 63. 
 70 See id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii). Article 8 provides the following: 
War crime of attacking civilian objects 
Elements 
1. The perpetrator directed an attack. 
2. The object of the attack was civilian objects, that is, objects which are not 
military objectives. 
3. The perpetrator intended such civilian objects to be the object of the attack. 
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.  
Id. 
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Having such a method for assessing culpability would 
facilitate the ability of a commander to articulate the basis for 
the judgment subject to critique. Furthermore, commanders 
may confront situations where the attack itself is not the basis 
for an allegation of criminality, but instead provides evidence 
supporting a broader allegation of improper conduct.71 For 
example, the propriety of an attack may be related to a broader 
allegation of genocide or crimes against humanity based on 
individual or joint criminal enterprise. In such a case, the 
LOAC arguably may not require proof that an attack against 
protected civilians or civilian property was intentional, because 
the probative value of the evidence of the improper attack would 
not be that the attack itself was a criminal violation, but that it 
demonstrated a broader illicit purpose to commit a chapeau 
offense.72 In such a situation, establishing that targeting 
decisions were unreasonable would contribute to proving the 
broader allegation by creating an inference that the overall 
purpose of the military operation was illicit. Assessing the 
reasonableness of such decisions without a quantum of 
information framework arguably invites arbitrary and subjective 
determinations. If this is true, then it is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the assessment of reasonableness, which 
requires an objective critique. What is necessary, then, is a 
methodology for assessing the objective reasonableness of a 
decision through the subjective perspective of the commander at 
the time of the decision. A quantum of information framework 
will contribute to the legitimacy of this process.  
  
 71 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-01-45-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 13-15 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2001), http://www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-ii010608e.htm. The prosecutor subsequently amended the 
original indictment to name two additional former Croatian generals—Mladen Markac 
and Ivan Cermak. Prosecutor v. Gotovia, Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Amended Joinder 
Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 17, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/ind/en/got-amdjoind070517e.pdf. 
 72 This is exactly how the prosecution relied on what it alleged was 
unreasonable target decision making in the trial of General Gotovina. The attacks on 
Knin were never alleged as crimes themselves. Instead, the prosecution asserted that 
the attacks manifested Gotovina’s intent to ethnically cleanse the Krajina of ethnic 
Serbs, thereby proving his complicity in a joint criminal enterprise. See, e.g., Prosecutor 
v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Prosecution’s Public Redacted Final Trial Brief, 
¶ I(A)(1) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100802.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, 
Gotovina Defence Final Trial Brief, ¶¶ 1-7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
July 27, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100727.pdf. 
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B. What Does Reasonableness Mean? 
Reasonableness is unquestionably the focal point of 
compliance with the military objective rule and, by implication, 
the principle of distinction.73 What, however, does reasonable 
mean in practical terms? There are two potential answers to 
this question. The first, which seems consistent with current 
practice, does not in fact define reasonableness, but merely 
emphasizes that each ad hoc targeting decision must be the 
result of a reasonable judgment. Commanders make ad hoc 
assessments of target legality based on instinctual assessments 
of the amount of information necessary to satisfy the elements 
of the military objective test (at times guided by the advice of a 
military legal staff officer, who, like the supported commander, 
is left with his own subjective determination of what amount of 
information renders the decision reasonable).74 An alternative 
approach is more pragmatic and would link the definition of 
reasonableness to a quantum of information component.  
The current ill-defined approach is certainly flexible, 
but it creates a number of deficiencies. First is the absence of a 
uniform standard for assessing the quantum and quality of 
information to support a targeting decision. This lack of 
uniformity necessarily requires tolerance of potentially 
disparate judgments. Second, the lack of a uniform quantum 
standard subtly dilutes the influence of staff officers (and 
especially the legal advisor) in the target decision-making 
process. Without a defined quantum requirement, the staff 
officer must ultimately concede that determining whether the 
military objective test is satisfied is within the pure subjective 
discretion of the commander. This effect is related to the third 
deficiency: the lack of a consistent framework for post hoc 
critique of the reasonableness of the commander’s decision.  
  
 73 BURTON, supra note 40, at D-4. 
 74 THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW § 467 (Dieter 
Fleck ed., 2008) (“However, all military actions involve an extremely high degree of 
factual uncertainty, which necessarily means that the decision of the responsible 
commander can only be judged on the basis of information available to him at the time 
of the decision, and not on the basis of hindsight.”); SOLIS, supra note 6, at 255 
(relaying the story of an Israeli soldier who said, “Maybe I’ll tell you a story. A car 
came towards us, in the middle of the [Lebanese] war, without a white flag. Five 
minutes before another car had come, and there were four Palestinians with 
RPGs . . . in it—killed three of my friends. So this new Peugeot comes towards us, and 
we shoot. And there was a family there—three children. And I cried, but I couldn’t take 
the chance.”). For a general overview of the targeting process, see JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, supra note 27, at v. 
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The lack of a defined quantum standard is most palpably 
detrimental to any effort to subject the target decision to post hoc 
review. Whether for purposes of administrative investigation, 
process review and refinement, or criminal sanction, assessing 
whether a commander acted reasonably without a defined 
quantum of information framework renders the assessment 
inherently arbitrary.75 This detrimental effect has two possible 
manifestations. One is that the finder of fact will be disabled in 
performing the objective reasonableness assessment because of 
an inability to effectively critique the reasonableness of the 
decision based on the subjective perspective of the commander at 
the time the decision was made. This, however, is unlikely for the 
simple reason that the mandate of an investigation or 
adjudication is to reach a conclusion.  
The alternate and more likely manifestation is that the 
reviewing official or entity will simply apply her own subjective 
determination of what quantum of information renders a 
judgment reasonable. This substitution of subjective judgment 
is particularly troubling, for it contributes to disparate 
outcomes and subjects the commander under scrutiny to a post 
hoc judgment based not on a standard of reasonableness 
analogous to that used at the time of the decision, but on the 
subjective instincts of the reviewing official or entity. In short, 
without linking reasonableness to a defined quantum of 
information, the law invites subjective and inherently arbitrary 
determinations of whether a commander acted in compliance 
with his obligations. 
This latter effect was exposed during the recent trial of 
General Ante Gotovina. In 2008, General Gotovina was 
convicted by the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Tribunal) for, among other things, unlawful 
attacks on civilian population centers as part of a joint criminal 
enterprise to ethnically cleanse Croatia of ethnic Serbs.76 
Central to the prosecution’s theory that Gotovina engaged in 
ethnic cleansing of Croatian Serbs from Krajina was the 
allegation that he used indirect fires against the city of Knin, 
the capital of the Croatian Serb break-away region of Krajina.77 
According to the prosecution, General Gotovina’s use of 
  
 75 See Corn & Corn, supra note 2, at 41.  
 76 Adam LeBor, Croat General Ante Gotovina Stands Trial for War Crimes, 
TIMES (London) (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/ 
article3522828.ece. 
 77 Id. 
456 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 
artillery and rocket fire against targets in Knin was intended 
to terrorize the civilian population.78 By demonstrating the 
inherent unreasonableness of his target selections, the 
prosecution hoped that proof of this indirect fire would support 
a circumstantial inference that the overall objective of the 
operation he commanded (Operation Storm) was to force Serbs 
from the territory. Accordingly, it was not necessary for the 
prosecutor to establish intent to attack protected persons and 
places. Instead, by demonstrating the inherent 
unreasonableness of his selection of methods and means of 
attack against targets within the city, the prosecutor would 
achieve the purpose of corroborating the broader illicit motive.79 
In response, the defense offered evidence in the form of 
expert opinions that focused on the propriety of designating 
and subsequently attacking certain buildings and areas within 
Knin. Through this evidence, the defense argued that, based on 
the facts available at the time Gotovina approved the attacks, 
each nominated target qualified as a lawful military objective 
and the methods and means used to attack these objectives 
were appropriate. The defense also challenged the probative 
value of a report offered by the prosecution’s expert who 
reached the exact opposite conclusion. The defense theory was 
clear: it was reasonable for Gotovina to conclude that all of the 
nominated targets located within the city of Knin were either 
being utilized by Croatian Serb forces for military purposes 
(such as use as headquarters or barracks) or were valuable for 
other military purposes (such as to facilitate movement of 
reinforcements or supplies).80 The prosecutor challenged much 
of this opinion, particularly in relation to buildings and places 
that were not purely military in nature (such as a rail yard, or 
an apartment building housing the civilian leader of the 
Croatian Serb forces).81 The Tribunal was therefore provided 
  
 78  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90, Prosecution’s Public 
Redacted Final Trial Brief, ¶ 492 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100802.pdf. 
 79 Id. ¶¶ 538-49.  
 80 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90, Gotovina Defence Final Trial 
Brief, ¶¶ 233-59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27, 2010), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom5/en/100727.pdf. 
 81 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Transcript, ¶¶ 7647-
54 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.icty.org/ 
x/cases/gotovina/trans/en/080901IT.htm (interviewing Mr. Berikoff, a soldier, on the 
military target at Knin); Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Transcript, 
¶¶ 8251-53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 9, 2008), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/trans/en/080909ED.htm (interviewing Mr. Liborius, 
who detailed his analysis of the damage caused to civilian property).  
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with conflicting expert opinions on the reasonableness of 
General Gotovina’s judgments, punctuated by periodic 
interventions by the presiding judge who emphasized his view 
that reasonableness would depend on all the variables 
presented to General Gotovina at the time of his decisions. In 
its judgment, the Tribunal adopted most of the defense theory, 
although it ultimately concluded that evidence of artillery 
effects beyond the range of identified targets (combined with an 
unjustified use of artillery against the residence of the Croatian 
Serb President) proved the prosecution’s allegation.82 Currently 
pending appeal, this ruling may not be the final chapter in the 
case of General Gotovina.83 What is relevant here, however, is 
how the trial process revealed the consequence of an ill-defined 
concept of reasonableness. 
Although a substantial amount of time was devoted to 
the presentation of evidence related to the attack on Knin, and 
literally hundreds of pages of the trial judgment address this 
issue, there was no discussion of the amount of information 
required to render Gotovina’s targeting judgments reasonable. 
As a result, four distinct conclusions were invited: the 
conclusions reached by General Gotovina when he approved 
targets, the defense conclusion based on review of the evidence 
available to him at that time, the prosecutor’s conclusion that 
the evidence did not justify Gotovina’s legality conclusions, and 
the inchoate conclusion of the Tribunal. The absence of a clear 
quantum to define reasonableness therefore leads to an 
inherent arbitrariness in this assessment.  
For a charge of unlawful attack on civilians or civilian 
property, the current state of the law does arguably require a 
prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an attack 
on a target was intentional,84 although several decisions by the 
ICTY seem to have adopted a lower culpability standard.85 
However, requiring a prosecutor to meet this standard and 
prove that a target subjected to attack was not a lawful 
military objective does not eliminate the disabling effect of an 
  
 82 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90, Judgement Vol. II of II, ¶ 2620 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/ 
cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415_judgement_vol2.pdf. 
 83 Case Information Sheet: “Operation Storm” (IT-06-90) Gotovina & Markac, 
COMMC’NS SERV. OF THE INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/cis/en/cis_gotovina_al_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).  
 84 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.  
 85 About the ICTY: Criminal Proceedings, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/146 (last visited Sept. 8, 2011); see also 
supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
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undefined reasonableness quantum. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt requires the prosecutor to exclude every fair and rational 
hypothesis except that of guilt.86 In more specific terms, it 
requires the prosecutor to prove that there was no fair and 
rational justification for concluding a target qualified as a 
lawful military objective. So long as the commander can point 
to some information relied on for the target legality judgment, 
the court will have to assess the reasonableness of the 
judgment. As such, the post hoc assessment of whether the 
attack was intentionally directed against a protected person or 
place renders the critique inherently subjective. Therefore, 
without a quantum standard, there is no meaningful criterion 
upon which to meet this heightened burden in any but the most 
extreme cases, and the resulting assessment will be arbitrary. 
Reasonableness should not be based solely on an 
assessment of whether a commander considered information in 
support of his decision, but instead on the quality of the 
information that supported the decision. While this is almost 
certainly consistent with the application of the military 
objective test in current practice, it highlights the importance 
of defining the quantum component of reasonableness. 
Furthermore, the universally high standard for criminal 
responsibility for attacking civilians or civilian property87 
should not be relied upon as a justification to avoid a more 
functional assessment of reasonableness in the decision-
making process. Obviously, any commander who willfully (or, 
  
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 16 M.J. 475, 477 (C.M.A. 1983).  
 87 Several decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia have addressed the culpability requirements to sustain a charge of 
unlawful attack on non-combatants. These cases have appropriately focused on the 
question of whether the commander knew the object of attack was a civilian or civilian 
property. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 54-64, 
121-29, 161-66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Boškoski, 
Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 61-68, 84-86, 93-95, 100-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_ 
tarculovski/acjug/en/100519_ajudg.pdf. Thus, culpability for violation of the principle of 
distinction attaches only when the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the commander launched the attack “intentionally in the knowledge . . . that 
civilians or civilian property were being targeted . . . .” Prosecutor v. Bla[ki], Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 
2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf. This has been 
further defined as including a reckless judgment. Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-
11-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 90, 96 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-
98-29-A, Judgement, ¶ 140 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf. 
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according to the ICTY, recklessly)88 attacks a target he knows is 
civilian in nature has violated the principle of distinction and 
the law of military objective. However, at the operational 
execution level, the principle of distinction along with the rule 
of military objective requires more of a commander—a good-
faith determination that the object of attack qualifies as a 
military objective. It is this determination that should be the 
focal point of improving the decision-making process by 
identifying a rational quantum of information framework. 
Shifting the focus of compliance with the military objective test 
to the criminal consequence of noncompliance coupled with the 
high burden of proof required to establish that liability 
undermines the efficacy of the law to achieve its intended goal: 
facilitating good-faith and factually-sound attack decisions.  
All this indicates that both the operational decision-
making process and the post hoc critique of those decisions will 
be enhanced by linking the concept of target decision-making 
reasonableness with a quantum of information framework. 
There has, however, been a notable omission from the evolution 
of the targeting reasonableness test that raises a question: 
what is the requisite quantum of information that may 
legitimately result in a reasonable belief that a person, place, 
or thing qualifies as a lawful military objective? Such a 
framework would serve two purposes. First, the framework 
would facilitate good-faith operational decisions by providing 
commanders greater clarity on the standard against which to 
assess the sufficiency of available information relied on to 
make targeting judgments. Second, it would provide a 
consistent standard against which targeting decisions would 
subsequently be critiqued. The contemporary absence of a 
quantum framework contributes to the potential 
transformation of what is supposed to be a prospective 
assessment into a retrospective critique, focused not on the 
information available to the commander at the time of the 
decision, but on the actual facts discovered after the decision.89 
  
 88 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
 89 SOLIS, supra note 6, at 286-90 (citing The Hostage Case and concluding 
that “[a]s the opinion makes clear, . . . the standard of guilt or innocence is the facts as 
they appeared to the accused at the time, given the circumstances at the time”). 
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III. CONTEXTUAL REASONABLENESS: THE U.S. CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE MODEL  
An analysis of reasonableness in criminal investigations 
illustrates the value of developing a quantum of information 
framework linked to the reasonableness requirement of target 
decision making. In both police search and seizure and military 
targeting contexts, operational decisions must be reasonable, 
and so they are often subjected to post hoc administrative 
and/or criminal investigations to assess their reasonableness.  
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
imposes reasonableness as the “touchstone” for assessing the 
legality of all searches and seizures.90 Unlike in the LOAC, the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard links the 
ultimate assessment of reasonableness with a defined quantum 
of information component. One quantum in constitutional 
jurisprudence is “probable cause,” which requires facts and 
circumstances that create a fair probability of truth.91 Another 
quantum is “reasonable suspicion,” which requires a 
“particularized and objective basis” for a belief “supported by 
specific and articulable facts.”92 This metric “allows [police] 
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them.”93 The appropriate 
quantum component is fundamental to assessing the 
reasonableness—and therefore the constitutionality—of a 
government action. So instead of employing a static quantum of 
information, constitutional jurisprudence imposes a shifting 
scale contingent upon the extent of the government intrusion 
at issue. When the government action results in a limited 
intrusion into a protected interest, the Supreme Court has held 
that a reduced quantum of information is appropriate for 
assessing reasonableness.94 But the Court never allows 
objective reasonableness to be established by reliance on the 
  
 90  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
 91  See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 
(2009). According to Safford, “the best that can be said generally about the required 
knowledge component of probable cause . . . is that it raise a ‘fair probability’ . . . or a 
‘substantial chance.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 
 92  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.3 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (9th ed. 2009)); see also United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-25 (2000). 
 93  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. 
 94  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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pure instincts of the police officer; rather, some articulable fact 
is required to justify inferences based on those instincts.95  
This quantum of information sliding scale developed in 
Fourth Amendment law provides a useful template for 
understanding the relationship between reasonableness and 
the amount of information relied upon by the government 
actor. This relationship between the operational context and 
the quantum of information necessary to justify government 
action offers a potentially beneficial analogy that may 
contribute to the targeting process. At a minimum, it offers an 
opportunity to begin to consider whether a similar approach 
might be effective for filling the lacunae in LOAC targeting 
analysis—a context that is also defined by the practical 
realities of fast-paced operational decision making.  
This part will begin by showing why an analogy 
between the law of war and the law of Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure is apt, and how the established quantum of 
information standards (probable cause, reasonable suspicion, 
etc.) make sense for assessing targeting decisions. 
A. Applying Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Military 
Targeting: Borrowing the Quantum of Information for 
Reasonableness Assessments 
The post hoc review of targeting decisions requires a 
framework that adjusts according to the severity of the 
threatened intrusion at issue. This is because reasonable is an 
arbitrary term lacking a quantum component. Without defining 
the requisite quantum of information to support a reasonable 
determination of lawful military objective, the reasonableness 
of that judgment cannot legitimately be assessed. Further, 
providing greater clarity on the requisite quantum element will 
contribute to the assessment of targeting judgments from the 
perspective of the commander at the time the judgment is 
made. It will preserve the objective nature of such an 
assessment without inviting a wholesale substitution of post 
hoc judgment for that of the commander at the time the 
decision was made.  
Providing a defined analytical framework for decision 
making facilitates a critique of the decision by focusing the 
assessment on the application of facts to the analytical 
  
 95  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
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framework. Indeed, this is one of the principal benefits of the 
military objective test: it provides a general framework that not 
only focuses analysis on facts and circumstances during the 
decision-making process, but also provides a benchmark for 
any subsequent critique of those decisions.  
Finally, enhancing the ability of the commander to 
articulate precisely why she considered a judgment reasonable 
will invariably mitigate the subjectivity of post hoc critique and 
facilitate both the decision-making and critique processes. 
Providing a framework similar in both concept and flexibility to 
the Fourth Amendment will likewise focus the decision-making 
analysis and subsequent critique and provide for greater clarity 
and less arbitrariness for the assessment of reasonableness in 
targeting. 
Like combatants, police officers constantly exercise 
operational judgment in fast-moving tactical situations. While 
these judgments do not routinely involve the application of 
deadly physical force,96 the investigation of and response to 
crime in a myriad of operational situations present challenges 
analogous to ensuring the reasonableness of military action. 
Like that of their battlefield counterparts, police exercise of 
operational discretion is often regulated by a legal requirement 
of reasonableness—a requirement derived from the Fourth 
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and 
seizure.97 Accordingly, like targeting decisions, reasonableness 
is the focal point of post hoc critiques of the legality of searches 
and seizures by law enforcement officers and is therefore 
central to the legitimacy of police action. In fact, the Supreme 
Court has consistently emphasized that “reasonableness is the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”98  
The reasonableness touchstone99 is not the only analogy 
between law enforcement officers and military commanders. 
There are a number of additional interesting similarities 
between U.S. search and seizure law and the law of targeting: 
  
 96 See, e.g., Study Examines Police Use of Deadly Force, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 
27, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/11/national/main3359288.shtml? 
source=RSSattr=U.S._3359288 (“[W]e have 2,000 deaths out of almost 40 million 
arrests over three years, so that tells you by their nature they are very unusual 
cases . . . .”). 
 97 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 21-22.  
 98 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).  
 99 See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-
T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 165-77 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 
5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf. 
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the imposition of a legal regulatory framework on nonlawyers 
engaged in operational decision making,100 the application of 
judicially defined framework parameters (what qualifies as a 
military objective and what qualifies as a search or seizure),101 
and the subsequent scrutiny of the operational judgment by the 
judiciary or relevant agency.102  
There is, however, one significant difference in 
application of the reasonableness touchstone in these two 
distinct contexts. Unlike the law of military objective, a central 
component of assessing reasonableness in relation to U.S. 
search and seizure law is a defined quantum of proof: the 
quantum component of reasonableness is not static but is 
adjusted contextually.103 United States search and seizure law 
has evolved to recognize a continuum of justifications matched 
to the degree of intrusion and operational context of the 
government action.104 Thus, in order to assess reasonableness, 
one must first determine the point along this continuum where 
the intrusion falls.  
Under the Fourth Amendment framework, the 
legitimacy of any government deprivation of liberty turns on 
satisfying an established quantum requirement. For example, a 
Terry stop will require mere reasonable suspicion, whereas 
punitive incarceration will require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.105 All criminal law quantum requirements reflect two 
critical principles of regulating government action in the 
criminal law context. First, the quantum of proof required to 
render government action justified cannot be unitary, for each 
  
 100 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 48-56. 
 101 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 89-120. 
 102 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (citing Katz, 389 
U.S. 347); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶¶ 165-77 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).  
 103 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 104 See, e.g., Peter E. Moran, Case Note, Fourth Amendment—Unreasonable 
Searches & Seizures—Unprovoked Flight Upon Noticing Police Officers While Present 
in a High-Crime Area Are Relevant Factors Which Create a Reasonable Suspicion to 
Justify a Terry Stop and Thus Does Not Violate the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition of 
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures—Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 11 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 859, 859-76 (2001) (discussing Terry and the recognition of the 
level of government intrusion).  
 105 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (“We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places,’ and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by 
the context in which it is asserted. For ‘what the Constitution forbids is not all searches 
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.’” (citations omitted)). 
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step in that process involves a different balance of interests.106 
Second, a definition of the requisite quantum of information is 
essential to facilitate a post hoc critique of the reasonableness 
of government action. Probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
both involve acting on suspicion, and yet the basis for 
satisfying the reasonableness requirement is calibrated to both 
the situation and the extent of the intrusion. Suspicion, the 
common element of both probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion, refers to “[t]he apprehension of something without 
proof or upon slight evidence.”107 However, to rise to the level of 
probability, the suspicion must be based on facts that establish 
a “likelihood of a proposition or hypothesis being true.”108 
Accordingly, probable cause requires a quantum of information 
establishing the suspected fact to a degree indicating the 
substantial likelihood of that fact being true.109  
Furthermore, this increased quantum requirement 
renders instinct and intuition less significant in relation to the 
legitimacy of the judgment. Like government efforts to detect 
and punish crime, targeting involves the exercise of judgment 
with profound consequences for the object of military action. It 
is practically axiomatic that like the domestic criminal context, 
these decisions must be reasonable.110 Moreover, because both 
the LOAC and human rights law prohibit arbitrary 
deprivations of life or property (even during armed conflict), 
reasonable deprivations of these fundamental interests in this 
context must require more than mere speculation or hunch.111  
Despite the similarities between criminal investigation 
and military targeting, the law of targeting lacks a quantum of 
information framework for assisting in the determination of 
  
 106 See id. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with the entire rubric of police conduct—
necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on 
the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, 
subjected to the warrant procedure.”).  
 107 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1447 (6th ed. 1990). 
 108 Id. at 1201.  
 109 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (defining the meaning of probable cause and the quantum of 
information required to establish probable cause in relation to Fourth Amendment 
compliance); see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 
(2009) (“[T]he best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component 
of probable cause . . . is that it raise a ‘fair probability’ . . . or a ‘substantial chance.’” 
(citations omitted)).  
 110 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
 111 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2= 
4&k=e1&p3=4& case=95; Corn, supra note 26, at 93. 
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reasonableness (or the subsequent critique of these 
determinations). Explicating the several ways in which U.S. 
search and seizure law is analogous to the law of targeting 
shows why this lack of a quantum component in targeting law 
is extremely problematic. 
The first way in which these two spheres are similar is 
that, like U.S. search and seizure law, the LOAC is intended to 
provide individuals operating in a complex and fast-moving 
environment with a meaningful and logical standard to guide 
their decisions. Indeed, the pressure on battlefield decision 
makers is almost invariably more intense and the situations in 
which these decisions are made more confused than those 
which confront police officers on the street. This complexity is 
only exacerbated by the reality that the human stakes involved 
in battlefield targeting are normally more significant than 
those involved in law enforcement operations. While it is true 
that law enforcement officers must in certain circumstances 
make judgments that jeopardize life, this is normally an 
exceptional situation because use of deadly force is considered 
a measure of last resort.112 In contrast, use of deadly force is an 
authorized measure of first resort in armed conflict.113 
Accordingly, placing life in jeopardy is the inevitable 
consequence of routine targeting judgments. Furthermore, 
even when law enforcement officers employ deadly force, the 
nature of that force rarely implicates risk to innocent 
bystanders to a degree normally associated with the use of 
combat power. In contrast, armed conflict targeting decisions 
routinely unleash combat power that creates a substantial risk 
of collateral damage and incidental injury to individuals who 
were not the deliberate objects of attack. 
Second, in both contexts, the law that regulates the 
government actor is intended to balance two critical but 
competing interests: achievement of the government objective 
and protection of the innocent from deprivations of life or 
liberty. The third, and perhaps most important, way these two 
fields are analogous is that the LOAC exists not only to guide 
the decisions of battlefield operatives, but also to provide a 
standard by which those decisions may be properly critiqued. 
Whether for the purpose of achieving procedural improvement, 
administrative discipline, or criminal sanction, the law of 
  
 112 See Corn, supra note 26, at 76, 93. 
 113 Id. 
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targeting, like search and seizure law, must provide a 
meaningful standard to assess the reasonableness of battlefield 
judgments for those who engage in these post hoc critiques. 
That, in turn, requires a more definite framework related to 
the contextual exercise of judgment.  
B. Probable Cause: The First Example of a Workable 
Standard to Meet the Realities of Pragmatic Decision 
Making 
Probable cause is a quantum of proof, which generally 
amounts to sufficient evidence to establish a fair probability.114 
In the search and seizure context, probable cause satisfies the 
substantive component of the reasonableness “touchstone” of 
Fourth Amendment compliance.115 Prior to the endorsement of 
reasonable suspicion as a valid standard of cause, probable 
cause was the lowest level of justification along the justification 
continuum.116 The central feature of probable cause is that it is 
intended to be a practical, not overly technical standard. As the 
Supreme Court noted, “[I]n dealing with probable cause . . . as 
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act.”117 Probable cause, therefore, refers to a 
level of cause that certainly exceeds mere suspicion but is able 
to respond appropriately to the workable realities of the street. 
The workability and fluidity of probable cause is 
reflected in the Supreme Court’s definition. According to the 
Supreme Court, “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and 
circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”118  
  
 114 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 
129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009). According to Safford, “the best that can be said generally 
about the required knowledge component of probable cause . . . is that it raises a ‘fair 
probability’ . . . or a ‘substantial chance.’” Id. 
 115 Knights, 534 U.S. 112. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined “by assessing, on the 
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). 
 116  It should be noted, however, that mere suspicion suffices to justify starting 
an investigation. See infra note 140. 
 117 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
 118 Id. at 175-76 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
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These illustrations of probable cause demonstrate that 
there is no exact conceptualization of the standard.119 In fact, 
“[p]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment 
of probabilities in particular factual context—not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”120 When 
determining if probable cause exists, the courts look to the 
totality of the circumstances from the standpoint of an 
“objectively reasonable police officer.”121 Unlike other standards 
under the law—e.g., proof beyond a reasonable doubt—
probable cause is a not a rigid concept. Instead, it is intended to 
be responsive to the realities of police investigatory practices, 
providing the officer flexibility in the use of his judgment but 
still ensuring ample protection for citizens against 
unreasonable government action.122  
One example of the application of the probable cause 
standard is Maryland v. Pringle.123 In this case, the defendant 
was riding in the passenger seat of a car when the police pulled 
the driver over for speeding.124 When the driver opened the 
glove compartment to get his registration the officer noticed a 
large amount of rolled-up cash.125 Upon the officer’s request the 
driver consented to a search of the vehicle which revealed $763 
in cash in the glove compartment and five baggies of cocaine in 
the armrest in the backseat of the car.126 Neither the driver, the 
defendant, nor the other passenger in the car would tell the 
officer who the drugs and money belonged to, so the officer 
arrested all three men.127 At the police station, Pringle 
confessed that the drugs and money belonged to him.128 At trial 
  
 119 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).  
 120 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).  
 121 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. 
 122 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to 
ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable 
cause existed. We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better 
achieve the accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment 
requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli.”). 
 123 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368. 
 124  Id. at 367. 
 125  Id. at 368. 
 126 Id. at 367-68.  
 127  Id. at 368. 
 128  Id. at 369. 
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the defense attempted to suppress the confession on the ground 
that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.129  
The Supreme Court concluded that Pringle’s arrest was 
in fact based on probable cause.130 Using the totality of the 
circumstances test outlined above, the Court found that the 
officer had probable cause to arrest all three individuals, 
including Pringle.131 The Court stated: 
There was $763 of rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly 
in front of Pringle. Five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were 
behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon 
questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with 
respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money. We think it an 
entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of 
the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control 
over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of 
possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.132  
The Court’s analysis reveals the application of the 
probable cause standard. The Court—through the eyes of a 
reasonable officer on the scene—looks at the circumstances and 
determines if the officer could have had a reasonable belief that 
the defendant committed the crime. Perhaps even more 
important for the thesis presented herein, the focus on a fair 
probability in Pringle meant that alternate probabilities did 
not render the conclusion unreasonable. In short, the suspected 
fact in probable cause may be one among several probabilities, 
and need not be the exclusive probability. 
Another case that describes the process courts go 
through to determine if probable cause existed is Illinois v. 
Gates.133 Based on a tip from an anonymous informant, the 
  
 129 Id. The trial court denied the defense’s motion and the jury convicted 
Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. The court of appeals reversed 
the trial court’s ruling stating that “absent specific facts tending to show Pringle’s 
knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, ‘the mere finding of cocaine in the 
back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car . . . is insufficient to 
establish probable cause for an arrest . . . .’” Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and overruled the state court. Id.  
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. at 372.  
 132 Id. at 371-72. 
 133 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the Bloomingdale Police Department 
received an anonymous letter by mail purporting to detail the illegal drug activity of Mr. 
and Mrs. Gates. Id. at 225. The letter informed the police of the Gates’ address, where 
they bought the drugs, and how they picked up the drugs. It concluded by stating, “At the 
time [Mr. Gates] drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in 
drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.” Id. The 
police department investigated each of the details of the letter regarding the address and 
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police obtained a warrant to search the Gateses’ trunk and 
home for marijuana and found “approximately 350 pounds of 
marihuana. A search of the Gateses’ home revealed marihuana, 
weapons, and other contraband.”134 The question before the 
Court was whether the anonymous letter along with the 
affidavit provided enough information to conclude that there 
was probable cause to issue the search warrant.135 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the decision of 
“the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant’s ‘veracity,’ 
‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in 
determining the value of his report. [The Court did] not agree, 
however, that these elements should be understood as entirely 
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in 
every case . . . .”136 Instead the Court applied a “totality-of-the-
circumstances approach.”137 This approach rejects any hard and 
fast rule and allows courts to balance probable cause with all 
the facts in front of them. In this case, the Court considered all 
of the facts and concluded: 
Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating 
not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of 
the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily 
predicted. The letter writer’s accurate information as to the travel 
plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only 
from the Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their 
not entirely ordinary travel plans. If the informant had access to 
accurate information of this type a magistrate could properly 
conclude that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable 
information of the Gateses’ alleged illegal activities. . . . It is enough 
that there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous 
letter had obtained his entire story either from the Gateses or 
someone they trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the 
letter’s predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a “substantial 
basis for . . . [concluding]” that probable cause to search the Gateses’ 
home and car existed.138 
This decision provides an important manifestation of 
the Court’s emphasis that probable cause is a practical 
standard intended to be applied by nonlawyers—not a 
  
the travel activities of the defendants and found them to be true; they then signed an 
affidavit and presented it, along with the letter, to a judge who granted them a warrant to 
search the Gateses’ residence and automobile. Id. at 226.  
 134 Id. at 227. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 230. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 245-46.  
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technical legal standard. Probability is the key, and in 
determining probability, all facts and circumstances must be 
considered. The emphasis on a workable, nontechnical 
standard responsive to the realities of operational application 
and compliance resonates with anyone familiar with the 
targeting process. Indeed, one hallmark of contemporary legal 
support in military operations is the emphasis on the ultimate 
role of the commander as the decision maker. Military lawyers 
may routinely facilitate this decision-making process, but legal 
judgment is not intended to become a substitute for command 
judgment. Probable cause, therefore, offers potential utility for 
the targeting process precisely because it has evolved as a 
practical and context-driven standard. 
C. Reasonable Suspicion: A Further Manifestation of the 
Importance of Context 
Just as context was the critical feature in formulating 
the probable cause quantum, the particular context of a 
government action is, to an even greater degree, fundamental 
to the reasonable suspicion standard.139 This very low 
quantum140 of information is custom-fitted to the intricate 
realities of law enforcement and is meant to protect citizens 
and police officers at the expense of only a minimal government 
intrusion into constitutionally protected privacy.141 When the 
intrusion into constitutionally protected privacy is minimal, the 
Supreme Court has held mere reasonable suspicion is sufficient 
to allow an otherwise unconstitutional search.142 By responding 
to the particular context of the situation, Fourth Amendment 
law provides a useful rubric for assessing targeting decisions 
that vary markedly based on context. 
The Supreme Court added a quantum lower than 
probable cause based on the recognition that not all police 
intrusions into privacy interests were made for the purpose of 
  
 139 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) 
(explaining that the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are “‘fluid 
concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts’ in which they 
are being assessed.” (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996))). 
 140  See Ronaldo V. Del Carmen, Terry v. Ohio, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 57, 66 (Ronaldo V. Del Carmen & Craig Hemmens eds., 2010). 
Reasonable suspicion is the minimum quantum of information required for a police 
officer to stop and frisk a suspect. Id. The lower standard of mere suspicion is sufficient 
to justify starting an investigation. Id. at 63. 
 141  See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 142  Id. 
2012] TARGETING 471 
arrest or evidentiary search. Instead, in the 1968 case Terry v. 
Ohio,143 the Court recognized that in many situations the police 
act on suspicion that an individual poses a danger of violence to 
them or surrounding individuals, or that the individual may be 
preparing to engage in criminal conduct. 
Terry involved the investigatory actions of a plain 
clothes officer in downtown Cleveland, Officer McFadden. 
McFadden, a detective with thirty-five years of experience, 
noticed three individuals “pacing, peering, and conferring” 
outside of a store window.144 Believing that the individuals may 
have been planning to rob the store, Officer McFadden watched 
them, and when they left, he followed. He approached the 
individuals to question them. But, fearing one might have a 
gun, he “spun [Terry] around so that they were facing the other 
two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted 
down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of 
Terry’s overcoat Officer McFadden felt a pistol.”145 The officer 
then had Terry remove his coat and took the pistol from him. 
Terry was charged with and convicted of carrying a concealed 
weapon.146 On appeal, Terry challenged the admissibility of the 
pistol and claimed that because McFadden lacked probable 
cause that he was armed, the evidence seized was the product 
of an illegal search.147  
The Court was forced to decide whether the search and 
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a 
decision complicated by the fact that the government conceded 
McFadden did not act based on probable cause.148 The Court 
determined that, when weighed in the balance of officer safety 
and Forth Amendment protection, a search like the one 
conducted by Officer McFadden is reasonable. The Court held,  
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
  
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 6.  
 145 Id. at 7.  
 146 Id. at 4.  
 147 Id. at 12. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of 
“whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to 
a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.” Id. at 15. 
The Court first rejected the government argument that only a full-blown arrest or 
evidentiary search implicates the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. For the Court, there was no question that Officer McFadden conducted a 
seizure and search of Terry; any other conclusion would be “sheer torture of the 
English language.” Id. at 16. 
 148 Id. at 15-16.  
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activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing 
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages 
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 
others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others 
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing 
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault him.149  
Terry’s holding is very narrow.150 This exception to the 
probable cause requirement applies only when the officer has a 
reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed. In order for a police 
officer’s conclusion to be considered reasonable it must be 
based “not [on] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch,’ but [on] the specific reasonable inferences which he is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”151 The 
officer must have some “specific and articulable facts” that lead 
to his conclusion that the suspect is armed.152 When an officer 
forms reasonable suspicion that “crime is afoot” and that a 
suspect is armed, it is reasonable for the officer to conduct a 
limited search of the suspect’s outer clothing (commonly 
characterized as a brief investigatory seizure)153 to confirm or 
deny the suspicion.154 The brevity of such seizures distinguishes 
the degree of intrusion from an arrest, and therefore justifies a 
reduced quantum of certainty to justify the action.155 
D. The Continuum of Cause 
The discussion above demonstrates that in the U.S. 
criminal investigation context, the amount of certainty a 
government agent must possess before depriving a person of 
liberty is contingent on the liberty interest at stake. The 
highest quantum of proof—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is 
required before an individual can be convicted of a crime and 
deprived of his life or freedom through incarceration or 
  
 149 Id. at 30. 
 150 See, e.g., Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding that the 
reasonable suspicion quantum endorsed in Terry could not be relied upon to justify a 
deprivation of liberty that exceeded the limited purpose of confirming or denying 
suspicion, and therefore could not justify the arrest of the Petitioner). 
 151 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
 152 Id. at 21. 
 153 See id. at 29.  
 154 See id. at 30.  
 155 See id.  
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execution.156 Probable cause, on the other hand, is a much lower 
standard and requires only a reasonable belief to justify the 
search or seizure of property or a person.157 Although less 
common in the criminal procedure context, there are two 
additional quanta relevant to the analysis here—a 
preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing 
evidence. Both of these quanta fall between proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and reasonable suspicion on the quanta 







 156 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).  
 157 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).  
 158  See United States v. Gay, 16 M.J. 475, 477 (C.M.A. 1983).  
 159  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (6th ed. 1990). 
 160  See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997). 
 161  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 162  See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 163  See supra notes 107, 185 and accompanying text.  
Standard Definition 
Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
Information that excludes every fair and 




Information that establishes a degree of 
certainty greater than “more likely than 




Information that establishes a fact is more 
likely than not to be true160 
Probable Cause Information that establishes a fair 
probability, although not necessarily a 




An objective fact that, when considered 
through the lens of experience-based 




A judgment based on hunch or instinct 
with no supporting objective fact163 
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Preponderance of the evidence falls fourth on the 
continuum under clear and convincing and above probable 
cause. It is defined in federal jury instructions for civil law 
suits as evidence sufficient 
to prove that something is more likely so than not so. In other words, 
a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when 
considered and compared with that opposed to it, has more 
convincing force and produces in your minds belief that what is 
sought to be proved is more likely true than not true.164  
The preponderance of evidence standard is used to protect civil 
interests.165 
Clear and convincing evidence is the standard of proof 
that falls above a preponderance of the evidence and under 
beyond a reasonable doubt on the continuum of proof. The clear 
and convincing standard is used to protect an “important 
individual interest in civil cases.”166 It applies when “[t]he 
interests at stake . . . are deemed to be more substantial than 
mere loss of money,”167 such as where the state is attempting to 
terminate parental rights168 or where civil commitment is 
sought because of mental illness.169  
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court determined 
that “clear and convincing evidence” was the appropriate 
standard for civil commitment. In that case, Addington’s 
mother petitioned the court to have her son indefinitely 
committed to a state mental hospital after he was arrested for 
“assault by threat against his mother.”170 At the time, only a 
preponderance of the evidence was required to civilly commit 
someone under state law.171 The defendant argued that, as in 
criminal law, indefinite civil incarceration demanded proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the conditions necessary for 
commitment.172 The Court began by stating that “in considering 
  
 164 See, e.g., Williams v. Eau Clair Pub. Schs., 397 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 
2005) (quoting the jury instruction explaining preponderance of evidence).  
 165 For example, in Williams v. Eau Claire Public Schools, the judge issued the 
jury instruction above in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Id. In this case, Joyce 
Williams, the plaintiff, “applied for and was denied the position of Assistant Athletic 
Director . . . . She filed a charge of gender discrimination . . . and shortly thereafter, she claims, 
she was denied a pay raise in her position as secretary to the . . . principal.” Id. at 443. 
 166 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). 
 167  Id. 
 168  See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 169 Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.  
 170 Id. at 420. 
 171 Id. at 422. 
 172 Id. at 421-22. 
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what standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, 
we must assess both the extent of the individual’s interest in 
not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and the state’s 
interest in committing the emotionally disturbed.”173 The Court 
noted that the state has a legitimate interest in providing care 
for the mentally ill. It also noted that “[a]t one time or another 
every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which might be 
perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional 
disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is 
generally acceptable.”174  
The Court ultimately determined that it was because of 
the second category—the abnormal behavior that is actually 
acceptable—that a preponderance of the evidence was not a 
sufficient level of proof. However, for the Court, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was too strict a standard given the 
limitations of psychiatric diagnoses. The Court stated, 
Finally, the initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very 
different from the central issue in either a delinquency proceeding or 
a criminal prosecution. In the latter cases the basic issue is a 
straightforward factual question—did the accused commit the act 
alleged? There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment 
proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of 
the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to 
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on 
the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert 
psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the 
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to 
whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.175 
The Court held that the middle standard—clear and convincing 
evidence—was the appropriate standard for cases involving 
civil commitment.176  
The various quantum of information standards in the 
judicial context, as well as the burden of proof standards, find an 
appropriate place in American jurisprudence based on the 
gravity of the interest threatened. Courts have recognized that 
finding an appropriate framework often depends on recognizing 
the realities of the contexts in which the threatened deprivation 
takes place, and the ability of the state to protect its interests in 
that situation. Because targeting decisions are made in myriad 
  
 173 Id. at 425.  
 174 Id. at 426-27. 
 175 Id. at 429. 
 176 Id. at 432-33.  
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contexts—where the state interest, the ability of the state to 
protect its interest, and the threatened deprivation are always 
different—the rubric for assessing targeting decisions should 
change to reflect these changing contexts. 
IV. CONTEXTUAL REASONABLENESS AND OPERATIONAL 
TARGETING 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence is 
built on a three-pillar foundation. First, assessing what is or is 
not reasonable government action is contextually contingent. 
Second, a deprivation of rights based on mere speculation or 
instinct is per se unreasonable. Third, the amount of 
information required beyond speculation to render such a 
deprivation reasonable is contingent on the extent of the 
deprivation or intrusion—the more significant the intrusion, 
the greater the quantum of information required to render the 
intrusion reasonable.  
Like searches, target decision making involves variable 
levels of certainty. Information supporting a determination of 
target legality can range from pure speculation or hunch, to a 
degree of certitude akin to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and in many situations even proof of an almost absolute 
certainty. It would, of course, be possible to impose a unitary 
quantum requirement on all target legality decisions (for 
example, requiring proof sufficient to support a military 
objective conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt). However, such 
an approach is unnecessarily inflexible, and inconsistent with 
the nature of military operations.177  
The proportional relationship between the nature of the 
intrusion on a protected interest and the quantum of 
information required to render that intrusion reasonable offers 
a valuable analogue to the targeting process. In determining 
the legality of a proposed target, the quantum of information 
necessary to establish reasonableness should be directly linked 
to the potential consequences of erroneous judgments. Like 
  
 177 For example, military doctrine and practice recognizes that in many 
situations of armed conflict, forces may employ fires based almost exclusively on 
intelligence predictions of enemy dispositions. These “templated” fires are rarely based 
on a degree of certainty that enemy forces will in fact be present at the location of 
attack. Instead, commanders employ such fires based on the combination of the 
anticipated disposition of enemy forces and their battlefield intuition. In this context, a 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard would be functionally disabling. See Corn & 
Corn, supra note 2. 
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search and seizure law, this equation will adjust the requisite 
quantum to render a targeting judgment reasonable in relation 
to the risk of error—the greater the risk, the more demanding 
the information required to support the judgment. At the 
implementation level, this would result in an ascending 
quantum of information requirement in relation to the 
descending probability that the object of attack is a lawful 
military objective. The greater the presumption that a 
potential object of attack is not a legal military objective, the 
greater the quantum of information necessary to justify 
attacking the target. 
A. Context, Cause, and Target Selection 
In the context of targeting, the variable is not the degree 
of intrusion on a privacy interest, but instead the presumptive 
nature of the anticipated target of attack. Because all targets 
fall along a continuum of targeting legality, it is the strength of 
this presumption that varies from target to target. 
Traditionally, potential targets presumptively fall into one of 
two categories: military or civilian. As noted above, neither of 
these presumptions is conclusive, as each is subject to rebuttal 
by the appropriate facts and circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the law establishes presumptive legality of attack 
directed against military personnel, equipment, and facilities—
and the presumptive illegality of attacking all other persons, 
places, or things—provides a logical framework for a variable 
quantum of information requirement in relation to the 
reasonableness of targeting decisions.178 Thus, the quantum of 
information requirement should be directly linked to the 
accordant variation in initial presumption. 
In addition to these two broad categories—military and 
civilian—there is an emerging subcategory of lawful object of 
attack: presumptive civilians outside the area of active combat 
operations.179 Targeting these individuals is an integral aspect of 
what the United States initially characterized as the global “war 
  
 178 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.  
 179 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); Jordan J. Paust, 
Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors & Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in 
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 271-72 (2010); Afsheen John Radsan & 
Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA Targeted Killing, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1212; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The 
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm). 
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on terror” (but what is now referred to as self-defense targeting 
operations).180 According to the United States, these individuals fall 
within a category of underprivileged belligerents associated with a 
nonstate, transnational enemy: al Qaeda.181 Based on this 
characterization, the United States argues they are designated as 
lawful objects of attack pursuant to the inherent right of national 
self-defense (and possibly the principle of military objective).182 
Treating the struggle against al Qaeda as an armed conflict and 
subsequently attacking individuals who are not located within an 
active theater of ongoing military operations—including the attack 
on Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and drone attacks against al 
Qaeda operatives in Yemen—are both highly charged and 
controversial propositions.183 Nonetheless, there seems to be no 
indication that the U.S. practice of attacking these individuals 
based on the conclusion that they qualify as lawful military 
objectives will abate any time soon.184 One thing seems undisputed: 
targeting decisions related to these individuals are even more 
complicated than targeting decisions related to presumptive 
civilians operating within an area of active hostilities. 
  
 180 See Koh, supra note 179 (“Third, some have argued that the use of lethal 
force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes 
unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in 
legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the 
state may use lethal force . . . . Fourth and finally, some have argued that our targeting 
practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on 
assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent 
with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level 
belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not 
unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’”).  
 181 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 5; Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Transnational Armed Conflict: A ‘Principled’ Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror 
Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL L. REV. 45, 4 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1256380; Paust, supra note 179, at 237; Radsan & Murphy, 
supra note 179, at 1210.  
 182 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2; 
DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 90-91.  
 183 See Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War: Subcomm. 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and 
Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (written testimony of Kenneth Anderson), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579411. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi, 727 
F. Supp. 2d at 8-9; Andrew M. Harris, ACLU Sues U.S. Over Targeting Killing of 
Citizens, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30 2010, 4:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-
30/aclu-sues-u-s-government-over-targeted-assassination-of-american-citizens.html.  
 184 See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (labeling targeting decisions as a 
political question and declining to address their legality); Koh, supra note 179 (“What I 
can say is that it is the considered view of this Administration—and it has certainly 
been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser—that U.S. targeting practices, 
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply 
with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”).  
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It may be appropriate (from at least a national policy 
perspective) to impose a more demanding quantum of 
information on the targeting of individuals presumed not to be 
lawful military objectives than on those who fall within that 
presumption. The further attenuated the nominated object of 
attack becomes from a uniformed enemy (or his equipment or 
facilities), the greater the risk that the decision will result in 
an erroneous deprivation of life (or property). Informed by the 
evolution of the contextual meaning of reasonableness in the 
context of U.S. search law, the quantum of information 
required to render such a decision reasonable should not be 
uniform between these categories of potential targets precisely 
because the risk or error is not uniform.  
This leads to the key question: what quantum of 
information is sufficient to justify an attack on each category of 
target along the legality spectrum, ranging from military 
personnel, facilities, and equipment to civilians and civilian 
property qualifying as lawful objects of attack pursuant to the 
rule of military objective (often referred to as dual-use targets)? 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides a useful and logical 
framework to begin to answer this question.  
While the different target categories each justify a different 
degree of certainty before attacking, one principle of constitutional 
law is clear: government decisions that intrude upon an important 
individual interest can never be reasonable when based on 
speculation or hunch.185 In the search and seizure context, the 
classic example of acting on speculation is when a police officer 
engages in a search or seizure based solely on her instincts. 
Interestingly, this is probably the closest area of explicit symmetry 
between the law related to targeting and search and seizure law. 
The rule of military objective includes the requirement that the 
decision maker conclude that subjecting a person, place, or thing 
to attack will produce a “definite” contribution to military action.186 
According to the ICRC Commentary,  
[D]estruction, capture or neutralization must offer a “definite military 
advantage” in the circumstances ruling at the time. In other words, it is 
not legitimate to launch an attack which only offers potential or 
indeterminate advantages. Those ordering or executing the attack must 
have sufficient information available to take this requirement into 
  
 185 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“And in determining whether the 
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”). 
 186 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2. 
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account; in case of doubt, the safety of the civilian population, which is 
the aim of the Protocol, must be taken into consideration.187  
Distinguishing the term definite from potential or 
indeterminate suggests that the rule of military objective 
prohibits commanders from launching attacks based on only 
speculation or conjecture as to the value that will result from 
the attack. Accordingly, like search and seizure law, the rule of 
military objective excludes reliance on instinct or speculation 
alone as a sufficient basis to reasonably justify the conclusion 
that a person, place, or thing qualifies as a lawful military 
objective.188 However, in another striking similarity between the 
two bodies of law, the key to transforming operational instinct 
into a reasonable determination of military objective is some 
articulable fact that validates the instinct.189 
While no class of target may be attacked based solely on 
mere suspicion, the other defined degrees of certainty 
appropriately correspond to the particular presumptive target 
categories in a contextual basis.  
B. Presumptive Enemy Targets 
Targets that the LOAC presumes to be military (and 
therefore legal to attack) logically demand the lowest quantum 
of information for such an attack to be reasonable. The 
reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio is 
the lowest threshold of justification that may satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.190 Thus, 
when faced with a presumptive enemy force, this quantum 
equation is logically suited to provide the minimum acceptable 
quantum for reasonable targeting decisions. 
The transformation of unreasonable speculation to 
reasonable cause was central to the Supreme Court’s Terry 
holding.191 According to Terry, it is the additional element of 
some “articulable fact” that combines with experience-based 
intuition to rise above speculation and transform police instinct 
or hunch (speculation) into a reasonable suspicion.192 The Court 
  
 187 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 636.  
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. This is ostensibly emphasized in the quoted Commentary reference to 
“sufficient information.” Id. 
 190 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097 (1998). 
 191 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  
 192 Id. at 21. 
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acknowledged that it only requires a modest amount of 
information to satisfy this requirement and allow suspicion to 
be constitutionally reasonable without rising to the level of 
probability.193 But this was precisely because the degree of 
intrusion—and by implication the consequence of error—was 
lower than the degree of intrusion traditionally requiring 
evidence sufficient to establish a probability.194  
This quantum equation is logically suited to provide the 
minimum acceptable quantum for reasonable targeting decisions. 
Both targeting law and search and seizure law require more than 
speculation to render a judgment reasonable. The concept of 
reasonable suspicion is responsive to this requirement. However, 
what is most appealing about analogy to this standard of 
reasonableness is that it was developed specifically to be 
responsive to the realities of the “street”: the entire Terry opinion 
is focused on the need to develop a standard of reasonableness 
flexible enough to address the realistic situation of fast-developing 
police encounters.195 Equally compelling is the Court’s endorsement 
of reliance on experience-based intuition to transform seemingly 
insignificant information into reasonable suspicion.  
Just as in Terry, a test for reasonableness in the 
targeting context must account for the experience and intuition 
of the military commander. Information that may seem 
innocuous to those unfamiliar with military operations will often 
provide critical insight into enemy dispositions and intentions. 
Indeed, the process by which police officers combine information 
with their experience-based instincts to produce reasonable 
judgments, as explained by the Supreme Court, is almost 
identical to the process by which many commanders utilize 
tactical intelligence to inform their experience-based decisions.196  
The standard of reasonable suspicion is satisfied by a 
very modest amount of information, and relies heavily on 
instinct and intuition. This standard should only support a 
determination of legality for proposed targets that fall within a 
category of presumptive military objectives—namely enemy 
military personnel, equipment, and facilities. For these targets, 
a commander is justified in ordering an attack so long as there 
is some evidence that, when considered through the lens of 
  
 193 Id. at 10, 21.  
 194 See id. at 17-19.  
 195 Id. at 9-10.  
 196 This assertion is based on the author’s experience as a tactical officer with 
the United States Army.  
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military experience and intuition, supports the conclusion that 
the targets are lawful objects of attack.  
This flexible and concededly modest equation of 
reasonableness is necessarily tailored to the reality of military 
operations. Commanders are justified in attacking such targets on 
a minimal level of information because once such information is 
available, the risk of hesitation is grave: hesitation may be 
perceived as ceding initiative to the enemy force. Accordingly, 
prompt and decisive action in response to some articulable facts 
that indicate the target is an acceptable object is the operational 
norm and is justified by the risk associated with hesitation 
inherent in requiring a higher degree of certainty. This also 
bolsters the analogy to the origins of the reasonable suspicion 
standard, which was specifically responsive to the reality that 
once a police officer becomes aware of some facts that support 
instinct or intuition that “criminal activity may be afoot”—
especially criminal activity involving violence—hesitation would 
be inconsistent with operational reality.197 
This modest quantum is also necessary to accommodate 
templated targeting of enemy capabilities. Templated targeting 
involves attacking areas based on a prediction that either the 
enemy is occupying those areas or the enemy will utilize those 
areas.198 This targeting process is not based on mere speculation 
but instead is based on complex intelligence estimates involving a 
combination of known enemy dispositions, enemy doctrine, and 
anticipated enemy courses of action. Examples of such attacks 
include blind fires against an area determined to be the likely 
location of enemy artillery groups, or enemy assembly areas; blind 
fires along entry or egress routes for friendly aircraft focused on 
areas where the enemy would logically locate air defense assets; 
or blind fires against natural or man-made choke points along an 
anticipated enemy axis of advance or withdrawal.199 
All these situations involve the use of unobserved indirect 
fires against targets without verified presence of enemy forces or 
capabilities.200 The articulable facts that render the decision to 
attack such targets reasonable include assessment of enemy 
  
 197 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9-10. 
 198 See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 60, at 1-69, 1-95. 
 199  See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09: JOINT FIRE 
SUPPORT III-10(g) (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/ 
jp3_09.pdf (stating that nonlethal fire can be used to locate the enemy).  
 200 WAR DEP’T, FM 6-20: TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT, FIELD ARTILLERY FIELD 
MANUAL, III-12, III-16 (Feb. 5, 1944), available at http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/ 
fm6-20-artillery/artillery-general-ch1.html. 
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doctrine, prediction of enemy courses of action, and the instincts 
of commanders and intelligence analysis supporting those 
instincts. Requiring more than this minimal quantum of proof 
would effectively disable the use of such tactics, because it would 
almost inevitably pressure the commander to verify the actual 
presence of enemy forces. The key element in reasonableness is 
not, however, pure instinct. It is instead the combination of 
instinct with doctrine and predictions of enemy courses of action, 
evidence that will only be available in relation to targeting 
against organized enemy opposition groups. 
The modest quantum of information required to render 
suspicion reasonable is appropriate to support a judgment of target 
legality for the personnel, equipment, and facilities of a regular 
enemy armed force. Something more than this minimum, however, 
is required for targets that are presumptively civilian in nature.  
C. Rebutting the Presumption of Protection from Attack 
The reasonable suspicion quantum is insufficient to 
justify targeting objectives that are presumptively civilian 
because the quantum is too low to rebut this legal presumption. 
Accordingly, once the anticipated object of attack falls outside 
the category of enemy forces, equipment, or facilities, 
reasonableness dictates imposition of a heavier informational 
burden on the commander. The appropriate quantum here is 
the next higher standard established in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence: probable cause. As detailed in this section, the 
analysis is somewhat different for presumptively civilian 
individuals and presumptively civilian places and things. 
As noted earlier in this article, the rule of military 
objective explicitly accounts for the reality that many places and 
things presumed to be civilian may become lawful objects of 
attack by virtue of their nature, purpose, location, or use.201 
Military operators often refer to such places and things as dual-
use targets, which suggests that they are being used for both 
civilian and military purposes. This is somewhat misleading, 
because pursuant to the rule of military objective, it is the 
transformation to military value that justifies subjecting them to 
attack; that they may also offer some nonmilitary value is 
irrelevant to determining whether or not they qualify as lawful 
military objectives (although it is certainly relevant to the 
  
 201 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2. 
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additional assessment of whether an attack would violate the rule 
of proportionality202). Nonetheless, the initial civilian character of 
such objectives indicates that the target is presumptively 
protected from being made the deliberate object of attack. 
Because contemporary armed conflict rarely involves 
force-on-force engagements in areas isolated from civilian 
populations and infrastructure,203 it is a virtual axiom of 
military operations that attacks are routinely launched against 
places and property presumed to be civilian. Even when close 
combat falls into the increasingly rare category of isolation 
from civilian population centers (for example, when Coalition 
forces engaged Iraqi armed forces in sparsely populated areas 
of Kuwait and Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War), 
influencing the battle routinely involves targeting command, 
control, communications, intelligence, and logistics capabilities 
located within civilian populations centers.204 
Presumptively civilian targets are materially different 
than presumptively military targets. Unlike enemy forces in 
uniform, their equipment, or their installations, these targets 
have no preconflict association with enemy military capabilities. 
Instead, it is the “nature, purpose, location, or use”205 of these 
things and places that renders them lawful military objectives. 
Unlike presumptive military targets, the LOAC implicitly 
imposes a higher quantum requirement to justify the reasonable 
determination that these places and things qualify as lawful 
military objectives. According to Article 52 of AP I, “In case of 
doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or 
  
 202 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 105. 
 203 INT’L REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS (2007), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-867-ihl-challenges.pdf (“The majority of 
contemporary armed conflicts are not of an international character. The daily lives of 
many civilians caught up in these conflicts are ruled by fear and extreme suffering. The 
deliberate targeting of civilians, the looting and destruction of civilian property, the 
forced displacement of the population, the use of civilians as human shields, the 
destruction of infrastructure vital to civilians, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
torture, indiscriminate attacks: these and other acts of violence are unfortunately all 
too common in non-international armed conflicts throughout the world. The challenges 
presented by these conflicts are, to a certain extent, related to a lack of applicable 
rules, but more importantly, to a lack of respect for IHL.”). 
 204 See Persian Gulf Wars, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/ 
A0838511.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011); ‘Shock & Awe’ Campaign Underway in 
Iraq, CNN (Mar. 22, 2003, 3:58 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2003/fyi/news/03/22/ 
iraq.war/ (indicating the bombing occurred in the capital, Baghdad—a civilian 
population center).  
 205 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 52.2. 
2012] TARGETING 485 
a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to 
military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”206 The 
associated ICRC Commentary states, “[E]ven in contact areas 
there is a presumption that civilian buildings located there are 
not used by the armed forces, and consequently it is prohibited to 
attack them unless it is certain that they accommodate enemy 
combatants or military objects.”207 While the Commentary 
indicates a requirement that the commander be “certain” before 
attacking such a proposed target, there is absolutely no indication 
of the amount of information necessary to establish such 
certainty. This once again reveals the ambiguity produced by 
failing to link certitude requirements to a quantum framework. 
This presumptive protection from attack warrants an 
increased quantum of information to establish target legality, a 
quantum more fact-oriented than reasonable suspicion. 
Probable cause, which is the next level of proof in the search 
and seizure continuum, is thus a logical standard. Like 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause is intended to be a 
practical, common sense assessment of available facts and 
circumstances.208 Unlike reasonable suspicion, these facts and 
circumstances must establish a fair probability.209 A probability 
that a proposed target is a military objective by virtue of its 
nature, purpose, location, or use provides a sufficient quantum 
to establish the reasonableness of subjecting presumptively 
civilian property or areas to attack. However, in light of the 
consequences associated with attacking an individual as 
opposed to attacking a place or thing, this quantum is 
insufficient to justify attacking civilians who have forfeited 
their protection by directly participating in hostilities.210 While 
both civilian property and civilians themselves benefit from a 
presumption that protects them from being made the deliberate 
object of attack, the consequences of an erroneous judgment 
rebutting that presumption is obviously more significant for 
  
 206 Id. art. 52.3 (emphasis added). 
 207 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 638. 
 208 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
 209 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 210 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 51; INT’L 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008-09 (2008), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf [hereinafter 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE] (stating that if there is a doubt as to a civilian’s participation in 
hostilities the civilian should receive the “presumption of protection”). 
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persons than for property. The quantum of information that 
justifies attack on persons should therefore be more demanding.  
It is true that civilians will often be present in the 
vicinity of civilian property or places determined to qualify as 
military objectives and will therefore be subjected to attack, 
which will often endanger their lives. However, the targeting 
process begins with the decision to render a person, place, or 
thing a deliberate object of attack.211 Whether the nominated 
target may be made the deliberate object of attack requires an 
initial assessment pursuant to the rule of military objective (to 
which this proposed quantum component is related). The risk of 
inflicting casualties on civilian persons is not a factor in the 
military objective analysis so long as those casualties are the 
knowing but nondeliberate consequences of the attack. For 
example, a commander deciding whether to attack an apartment 
building being used by enemy personnel as a strongpoint in a city 
may know that civilians reside in the building, and may know 
that the attack will produce civilian casualties. This knowledge 
will trigger an assessment of whether the harm to civilians will be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated (the proportionality test).212 However, the commander 
does not engage in a proportionality analysis unless and until he 
determines the apartment building qualifies as a lawful military 
objective, which is the first step in the target-legality analysis. It 
is this determination that justifies the deliberate attack on what 
is presumed to be a protected place.213 Acting on the probability 
that civilian property or a civilian place qualifies as a lawful 
military objective strikes a logical balance between the realities of 
the operational environment, the protection of civilian property, 
and the level of risk inherent in the targeting decision. 
  
 211 In most cases, attacking presumptive civilian property or places—for 
example attacking an apartment building being used by enemy forces as a vantage point 
for artillery spotting or attacking a crossroads in a town in anticipation that it will be 
used by enemy forces to bring reinforcements to the close battle—will involve a known 
risk of inflicting casualties on civilians. But in these situations, those casualties will be 
the incidental and collateral consequence of the deliberate attack on property or a place.  
 212 Article 51.5(b) prohibits attacks that “may be expected to cause [injury to 
the civilian population] which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra 
note 4, art. 51.5(b). This language is again repeated in Article 57.2(b) which requires an 
attack to be canceled if it “may be expected to cause [injury to the civilian population] 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.” Id. art. 57.2(b). The ICRC commentary to Article 57 recognizes that this is 
not a cut-and-dry standard. Instead, it requires military commanders to act in good 
faith and weigh the injury to the civilian population against the “military interest at 
stake.” COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 683-84.  
 213 See, e.g., Corn & Corn, supra note 2. 
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The decision to deliberately attack an individual civilian 
involves a different balance of interests. First, the likelihood that a 
civilian will engage in the type of activity necessary to rebut the 
presumption of protection from attack—any activity that qualifies 
as a direct part in hostilities—is much lower than the likelihood 
that civilian property or places will be transformed into lawful 
military objectives. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
risks associated with erroneous judgment are normally more 
profound when deciding to target a person as opposed to a place or 
a thing. While attacking a presumptively civilian building might 
often involve inherent risk of injury to the occupants, attacking an 
individual always implicates risk to life. This reduced-
likelihood/increased-risk relationship has, in practice, rendered the 
presumption of protection afforded to civilian persons more 
significant than that afforded to property or places.214 
Like property or places, however, this presumption is 
and must be rebuttable. When civilians take a direct part in 
hostilities, they forfeit protection from being made the 
deliberate object of attack for the duration of their 
participation.215 While there has never been a consensus 
definition of the meaning of direct participation in hostilities (a 
topic of considerable contemporary debate)216 there has always 
been consensus that the combatant bears a heavy burden to 
verify that the civilian has crossed the line from inoffensive 
conduct to conduct that qualifies as direct participation.217 This 
determination subjects the individual to deliberate attack, 
normally with deadly combat power. Accordingly, the 
combatant’s judgment will almost always involve life and death 
consequences. While attacking places or things that also fall 
  
 214 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 613-23. 
 215 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 4, art. 51.3; 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 994.  
 216 See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 994. See generally Bill 
Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 637 (2010); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and 
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010); W. 
Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No 
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); 
Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: 
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive 
Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641 (2010).  
 217 DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 151-52.  
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under the presumption of civilian protection can also result in 
loss of life, the certainty of that effect is not comparable to the 
certainty associated with deliberately targeting human beings. 
All this leads to an unquestioned reality: civilians benefit 
from the strongest presumption of nontargetability, both legally 
and as a matter of operational practice. As a result, the 
extremely high risk to human life associated with the 
determination that a civilian is directly participating in 
hostilities warrants a more demanding quantum standard than 
what should be required to target civilian property or places. 
Acting on information that supports a mere probability is 
therefore insufficient to satisfy this requirement, because such a 
quantum fails to exclude alternate probabilities—it merely 
creates one among several. Increasing the quantum requirement 
to information sufficient to establish a preponderance—that it is 
more likely than not that the presumptive civilian is taking a 
direct part in hostilities—is the minimally acceptable quantum 
to rebut this critically significant presumption.218  
A preponderance requirement would normally be easily 
satisfied—and in fact exceeded—where the test for what 
qualifies as direct participation in hostilities is restrictive. Such 
a test would essentially require the civilian to be actually 
engaging in, or about to engage in, armed hostilities against 
friendly forces.219 In such situations, the use of deadly force in 
response to the threat would be based on a determination that 
the civilian presented a threat of overwhelming actual and 
imminent risk to the combatant. As a result, the test implicitly 
requires information that establishes beyond any doubt that the 
civilian has forfeited the presumptive protection provided by the 
law. Of course, there might be issues related to the quality of the 
evidence relied on by the combatant to engage the civilian. This, 
however, is a fundamentally different issue than the requisite 
quantum needed to render the judgment reasonable. In the 
former situation, the individual or tribunal reviewing the 
combatant judgment is essentially questioning whether the 
judgment was reasonable based on the facts and circumstances 
  
 218 The ICRC, in their report on direct participation, states that “[i]n order for 
the requirement of direct causation to be satisfied, there must be a direct causal link 
between a specific act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a 
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.” 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 1019. The study, however, does not 
address the quantum of proof required in the determination of a presumptive civilian’s 
participation in hostilities. Id. 
 219 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 43, at 619. 
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available at the time of the decision. While the quality of the 
information (the probative value of the information considered 
by the combatant) available at the time of the decision is 
certainly related to whether the requisite quantum was 
satisfied, these are two fundamentally distinct questions. 
The quantum requirement becomes far more significant in 
relation to an expanded definition of direct participation in 
hostilities, the type of definition that is gradually emerging in the 
international community. In its recently published Interpretive 
Guidance on the Meaning of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
the ICRC endorses the use of what is referred to as the 
“continuing combat function” test as a basis to conclude a civilian 
is taking a direct part in hostilities.220 Unlike the traditional 
actual and immediate harm standard reflected in the ICRC 
Commentary to AP I, the continuous combat function test extends 
the concept of direct participation in hostilities to individuals who 
routinely participate in activities that provide combat support to 
members of a belligerent party to a conflict.221 It was developed 
specifically to address the very difficult problem of individuals 
who conduct combat functions periodically for a belligerent party 
but then routinely return to their civilian activities.222 This so-
called “revolving door” problem was perceived by the experts 
gathered by the ICRC as necessitating this expanded test for 
determining when an individual was directly participating in 
hostilities and thus subject to lawful attack.223 
The relative merit of this expanded concept of direct 
participation in hostilities is beyond the scope of this article. 
What is relevant for this analysis is the challenge in 
determining when targeting an individual falling within this 
expanded definition of direct participation in hostilities is 
reasonable. Unlike the narrow definition of direct participation, 
this expanded definition will rarely produce the type of 
overwhelming evidence showing that the civilian has forfeited 
protection from attack that is inherent in a test requiring the 
civilian to have actually engaged in hostile action. Instead, 
commanders called upon to make the target-legality 
  
 220 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 1007-08. 
 221 Id.  
 222 Id. at 993-94. 
 223 An analogous expanded definition was adopted by the Israeli High Court of 
Justice in the Targeted Killing case. See HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in 
Israel v. Israel (Targeted Killings Case) 57(6) PD 285 [2006] (Isr.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.htm; INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 1035.  
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determination will be required to assess a variety of facts and 
circumstances related to the habitual conduct of the individual 
nominated for attack. Requiring the commander to be satisfied 
that the facts and circumstances make it more likely than not 
that such an individual is in fact engaging in a continuous 
combat function will make application of this expanded 
definition of direct participation in hostilities more legitimate. 
While a more demanding quantum may evolve over time as a 
matter of operational practice, a more-likely-than-not quantum 
standard is both rational and logical to balance the competing 
interests associated with application of this emerging and 
critically important test for target legality. 
D. A Third Category of Individual Targets: Belligerent 
Actors Outside an Area of Active Hostilities 
Many legal experts have criticized the invocation of LOAC 
authority as a justification for using predator drones to attack 
individuals significantly removed from the area of active combat 
operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.224 This criticism has focused on 
both the inherent invalidity of characterizing the struggle against 
terrorism as an armed conflict225 and the invalidity of treating 
civilian terrorists as lawful military objectives.226 Addressing these 
criticisms is well beyond the scope of this article, which assumes 
arguendo that these characterizations are justified and that the 
United States will continue to invoke the LOAC to justify attacks 
on such individuals. 227 Instead, what is critical for this analysis is 
the requisite quantum of information necessary to justify the 
  
 224 Letter from Jonathan Manes, ACLU, to Dir., Freedom of Info. & Sec. Review, 
Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-1-13-
PredatorDroneFOIARequest.pdf (outlining recent news reports of drone attacks and 
expressing a need for more information as to their justification); Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in 
SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., 
forthcoming), available at https://webspace.utexas.edu/rmc2289/LT/Mary%20Ellen% 
20OConnell%20on%20Drones.pdf; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 85-86, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston).  
 225 Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global 
War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535, 539 (2006).  
 226 See O’Connell, supra note 224, at 21-25.  
 227 Mark Hosenball, Obama Administration Official Publicly Defends Drone 
Attacks, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 26, 2010, 11:33 AM) http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
newsweek/blogs/declassified/2010/03/26/obama-administration-official-publicly-defends-
drone-attacks.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) (stating that the “considered view of this 
administration . . . that targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the 
use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war”).  
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military objective determination and render the attack on such 
individuals reasonable. While this may have been close to 
conclusive in the case of Osama bin Laden, it is far more complex 
for a deliberate attack of “day-to-day” terrorist operatives.228 
One of the most complex legal issues resulting from the 
U.S. decision to characterize the struggle against transnational 
terrorism as an armed conflict229 is the legality of targeting 
nonstate belligerent actors outside of the area of active combat 
operations. This challenge is exemplified by the debate over the 
use of predator drones to attack suspected Al Qaeda operatives in 
places like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.230 One aspect of these 
attacks that is straightforward is identifying the legal basis relied 
on by the United States: a determination that the individual 
subjects of attack qualify as lawful military objectives.231 
The quantum related to the determination of target 
legality becomes critical in this decision-making process. In 
essence, targeting of such terrorist operatives adds new levels 
of complexity to this complicated issue of targeting civilians 
who take a direct part in hostilities. Initially, it is not even 
clear that if al Qaeda operatives fall within the LOAC targeting 
authority they should be considered presumptive civilians.232 
Although the emerging concept of continuing combat function 
seems to accommodate the perceived need to attack such 
operatives, the position of the United States appears to indicate 
that they are instead considered enemy belligerents for targeting 
purposes, not civilians taking direct part in hostilities (a position 
which ironically finds some support in the Direct Participation 
Interpretive Guidance).233 Irrespective of whether the legality of 
  
 228 See, e.g., FRONTLINE: Kill/Capture (PBS television broadcast May 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kill-capture/#ixzz1Vn10mWyR. 
 229 See Corn & Jensen, supra note 181, at 49; Koh, supra note 179. See 
generally Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Obama Administration’s First 
Year and IHL: A Pragmatist Reclaims the High Ground, 12 Y.B. OF INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 263 (2009). 
 230 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Paust, 
supra note 179, at 250-55. 
 231 See Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Steps Up Drone Attacks on 
Taliban in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
09/28/world/asia/28drones.html (discussing the targets of the drone attacks).  
 232 See Geoffrey Corn & Lieutenant Colonel Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the 
Combatant COIN: Untangling Direct Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent 
Status in Non-International Armed Conflicts, U. PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604626.  
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targeting these individuals is analyzed by application of the 
direct part in hostilities rule or by application of the principle of 
military objective (by treating these individuals as enemy 
belligerents), the threat identification issue remains extremely 
complex. Under either category, the basis upon which the target 
legality judgment will be made will invariably focus on the 
continuing and habitual conduct of the individual. 
Relying on conduct as a basis to determine target 
legality is unfailingly more difficult than relying on a 
traditional objective indication of military status such as a 
uniform. However, this has always been the criterion used to 
determine whether a civilian directly participates in 
hostilities.234 This conduct-based targeting determination is 
already complex in the context of ongoing ground combat 
operations. It becomes increasingly more difficult as the 
individual object of attack becomes further removed from the 
area of direct hostilities. Under the traditional restrictive 
definition of direct participation in hostilities, the weight of the 
presumption of civilian status arguably increases with 
attenuation from an area of active ground combat operations. 
This is the simple consequence of the reality that individuals 
can only take a direct part in hostilities in the vicinity of 
combat operations. But the nature of transnational terrorist 
operations has called into question the correlation between 
proximity to an area of active combat operations and the 
weight of the presumption of civilian status.235 
This complexity is at the heart of the debate 
surrounding the ICRC Interpretive Guidance.236 The continuous 
combat function concept endorsed by that study is an implicit 
recognition of the effect of the asymmetrical tactics relied upon 
by contemporary nonstate actors engaged in armed 
hostilities.237 These tactics may result in the legitimate 
determination that individuals who are not proximate to an 
area of active combat operations may nonetheless directly 
participate in hostilities. The controversy associated with this 
proposition is ostensibly based in part on the risk of error 
associated with the determination of target legality rather than 
the conclusion that direct participation in hostilities does not 
  
 234 See generally INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210. 
 235 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Al-
Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 236 See, e.g., INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 210, at 1009. 
 237 Id. at 1008-09. 
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always require proximity to actual combat operations.238 
Recognizing this concern justifies a demanding quantum of 
information to warrant the determination that an individual is 
taking a direct part in hostilities (and therefore may be 
attacked) when attenuated from active military operations. In 
short, the controversy associated with engaging in these 
attacks when coupled with the inherent risk of error in the 
determination of target legality warrants a quantum 
requirement that will contribute to accuracy and legitimacy.  
Commanders cannot be expected to achieve absolute 
accuracy in their judgments. Still, it does seem legitimate to 
require that the information available be sufficient to clearly 
support the target legality conclusion that such individuals are 
in fact lawful objects of attack.239 At least one scholar has 
proposed imposing a proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard,240 which would certainly be the most demanding 
quantum standard. However, the inherent judicial nature of 
this standard and the vagaries of its meaning241 call into 
question the utility of this proposal. A clear and convincing 
requirement seems more logically suited to this decision-
making context. Commanders would be required to assess 
available information and conclude not merely that it is more 
likely than not that the individual nominated for attack is an 
enemy belligerent, but that the information establishes this 
status so convincingly that the conclusion is clear. This 
quantum standard would require the commander to be 
convinced that the available information excludes any 
alternate hypothesis inconsistent with the conclusion that the 
individual nominated for attack is in fact an enemy 
belligerent.242 Unless available information provides that level 
of certitude, the commander would be required to forego attack. 
This demanding standard of proof would facilitate attack on 
enemies operating outside a conflict area while limiting such 
attacks to only those cases involving a high degree of certitude. 
In so doing, it would mitigate the risk associated with what 
  
 238 Id. at 1009. 
 239 This may in fact be the standard being applied by the government in ongoing 
target decision making. See Obama Administration Claims Unchecked Authority to Kill 
Americans Outside Combat Zones, ACLU (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/obama-administration-claims-unchecked-authority-kill-americans-outside-
combat-zone.  
 240  Radsan & Murphy, supra note 179, at 1207-08. 
 241  See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 21 (1994). 
 242  See United States v. Gay, 16 M.J. 475, 477 (C.M.A. 1983). 
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many believe is an overbroad assertion of the LOAC-based 
targeting authority, protect the government from allegations 
that targeting decisions are arbitrary in nature, and preserve 
the ability to attack when the government is able to amass this 
type of compelling intelligence. 
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR APPLICATION OF THE QUANTUM 
ELEMENT OF REASONABLENESS 
No quantum of information can ever universally guarantee 
that objects of attack are lawful targets. However, the law has 
never required that commanders must always be correct in their 
assessments of target legality. Instead, the requirement that 
targeting judgments be reasonable accepts the inevitable reality 
that sometimes those judgments are, however innocently, 
incorrect. Reasonableness, though, is an objective standard. 
Accordingly, a more defined and predictable quantum of 
information framework will both improve the assessment of target 
selection and guide potential post hoc critiques of such judgments. 
This framework will also enhance the value of operational legal 
advice by facilitating the legal critique of nominated targets. This 
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CONCLUSION 
The battlefield is not an environment where all 
potential targets are of equal character. Instead, targets range 
over a broad spectrum of certainty. As such, the reasonableness 
of a target legality judgment must be responsive to this 
spectrum of (un)certainty, must accommodate the realities of 
armed conflict, and must ensure a proper balance between 
mitigation of risk of error and the necessity of prompt and 
decisive military action. Furthermore, any quantum of 
information component for assessing the reasonableness of 
target decision-making will ultimately require implementation 
at both the operational level and during post hoc critiques. 
Indeed, this requirement is already inherent in both of these 
aspects of assessing target legality.  
The notion of providing a more predictable reasonableness 
assessment framework is not radical. Commanders, and the 
military staff officers (including military legal advisors) who 
advise them, instinctively focus on the facts and circumstances 
available at the time these decisions are made to frame their 
judgments as to the legality of engaging proposed targets. When 
these decisions are subject to post hoc critique, the investigators 
or tribunals assessing the decision-making process must also 
inevitably focus on the facts and circumstances prevailing at the 
time as the foundation for their determinations. The inevitability 
that facts and circumstances will be considered in the assessment 
of reasonableness absent a defined quantum of information 
framework undermines the legitimacy of both target decision 
making and subsequent critiques. 
Establishing quantum framework, however, will not 
necessarily ensure credibility and legitimacy of the target 
decision-making process. That credibility and legitimacy stems 
first from a good faith commitment to gather as much 
information related to potential targets as possible and to 
assess that information as thoroughly as possible given the 
conditions of combat. The credibility and legitimacy of any 
subsequent critique of the target decision-making process must 
also begin with a good faith commitment to assess the judgment 
through the subjective lens of the operational decision maker. Any 
legitimate critique must rely on the situation that was confronted 
by the commander at the time of the decision, and to refuse to 
consider facts and circumstances that were unavailable or 
unknown to the commander at the time. Establishing a quantum 
of information framework for the target decision-making process 
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will strengthen the effectiveness of the process at both levels. At 
the operational level, it will arm legal advisers with a more 
concrete standard of review in support of their advisory role. Even 
when commanders do not have the benefit of legal advice, 
predeployment training that incorporates these quantum 
requirements will facilitate quality decision making by solidifying 
and clarifying the standards for target decision making. 
Using a quantum framework will make an even more 
significant contribution to the legitimacy of post hoc critiques of 
targeting decisions. Legitimacy of such critiques is critically 
important for ensuring effective accountability for battlefield 
misconduct, but it is also important to ensure that commanders 
are able to act decisively in the intensely chaotic environment of 
armed conflict. This importance has recently been highlighted 
by the critical response to the Goldstone Report assessing the 
legality of military operations conducted during Operation Cast 
Lead, the 2008 Israeli incursion into Gaza.243 Much of the 
criticism of the findings of the Goldstone Report focused on an 
improper methodology utilized to assess the reasonableness of 
Israeli target selection and engagement.244 Establishing a 
quantum framework will contribute to future assessments of 
reasonableness and potentially mitigate the temptation to 
critique battlefield decisions retrospectively. Instead, under the 
quantum of information framework, such critiques would 
become more properly focused on the facts and circumstances 
available to an operational decision maker at the time of target 
selection to see whether the requisite quantum was met. 
Providing a framework that will enhance the probability 
of such focus is consistent with the proper standard of review 
for any military operational decision. Because targeting 
decisions are subject to a test of reasonableness, those decisions 
must be assessed through the subjective lens of the decision 
  
 243 U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories, Rep. of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess., 
Sept. 15, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf.  
 244 For a critique of the Goldstone Report, see Lieutenant Colonel Chris Jenks 
& Geoffrey Corn, Siren Song: The Implications of the Goldstone Report on International 
Criminal Law, 7 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST, Winter 2011, http://bjil.typepad.com/ 
publicist/vol-7-winter-2011; see also Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the 
Law: The Goldstone Report and Lawfare, CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 279, 298 (2010). 
Judge Goldstone has subsequently acknowledged flaws in the report. See Richard 
Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War Crimes, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-
report-on-israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html. 
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maker. While reasonableness does require an objective 
assessment of the ultimate decision, the facts and 
circumstances upon which that objective assessment should be 
made are the facts and circumstances as viewed by the 
commander at the time of action. In this regard, the proper 
application of the reasonableness assessment involves a 
combined subjective/objective critique. The ultimate question is 
whether, based on the subjective perception of the commander 
at the time of the decision, the decision was objectively 
reasonable. A quantum framework will facilitate the legitimacy 
of the target decision, allow the commander to more effectively 
articulate her thought process during subsequent review, and 
ultimately allow the individual or tribunal conducting this 
critique to focus on the facts and circumstances that were 
available and consider those facts and circumstances through 
the commander’s perspective. 
